Imbuing airborne electronic warfare self-protection : possibilities to disguise by Sippola, Jussi
  
MAANPUOLUSTUSKORKEAKOULU 
IMBUING AIRBORNE ELECTRONIC WARFARE SELF-
PROTECTION – POSSIBILITIES TO DISGUISE 
  
Master‘s thesis 
1
st
 Lieutenant 
Jussi Sippola 
SM3 
Military technology 
April 2014 
  
Kurssi 
Sotatieteiden maisterikurssi 3 
Linja 
Maasotalinja 
Tekijä 
Yliluutnantti Jussi Sippola 
Opinnäytetyön nimi 
IMBUING AIRBORNE ELECTRONIC WARFARE SELF-PROTECTION – POSSIBILITIES TO DISGUISE  
Oppiaine, johon työ liittyy 
Sotatekniikka 
Säilytyspaikka 
Maanpuolustuskorkeakoulun kurssikirjasto 
Aika  
Huhtikuu 2014 
Tekstisivuja 63                         Liitesivuja 0 
TIIVISTELMÄ 
Tutkielman nimi käännettynä suomeksi on Lentokoneiden omasuojajärjestelmien kyllästäminen – 
mahdollisuuksia kätkeytymiseen. Siinä keskitytään etsimään aktiivisia, ilmauhkaa kohti säteileviä 
keinoja ilmahyökkääjän, lentokoneen tai helikopterin, omasuojajärjestelmän harhauttamiseksi. 
Järjestelmät pyrkivät varoittamaan lentäjää laser- ja tutkasäteilyhavainnoista sekä ohjuksen 
laukaisusta ja lähestymisestä. Omasuojajärjestelmiin kuuluviin vastakeinoihin tutkimus ei keskity. 
Tavoitteena harhauttamisella on ilmapuolustuksen todellisen määrän ja sijainnin suojaaminen. 
Epätietoisuus voi saada lentäjän tekemään vääriä johtopäätöksiä. Työ ei fokusoi harhauttamisen 
taktiseen kehykseen työn kannalta tarpeellista määrää enempää. Tietosuojasyistä tutkimus ei käsittele 
käytössä olevien omasuojajärjestelmien operatiivisia ominaisuuksia vaan käsittelee teoriaa niiden 
taustalla.  
Tutkimus tehtiin käyttäen taustatutkimukselle enemmän tyypillistä kirjallisuustutkimusta. Jo tutki-
muksen alkuvaiheessa oli oletettavaa, että elektronisiin sensoreihin perustuvaa omasuojajärjestelmää 
pystytään harhauttamaan. Systeemianalysoinnilla pyrittiin löytämään vastauksia tähän olettamukseen. 
Omasuojajärjestelmästä muodostettiin jo tutkimuksen varhaisessa vaiheessa malli. Tieteellistä 
kirjallisuutta omasuojajärjestelmistä on olemassa jonkin verran, ja niistä löydettyä tietoa 
omasuojajärjestelmien ominaisuuksista ja sensoreista yhdistettiin malliin niin, että siitä saatiin 
mahdollisimman tarkka systeemin kuvaus todellisesta omasuojajärjestelmästä. Analyysin tavoitteena 
oli löytää niitä kriteereitä, joilla omasuojajärjestelmä saataisiin kohtuullisen tehokkaasti uskomaan 
harhautusta oikeaksi hälytykseksi. 
Ohjuksen laukaisusta varoittava sensori perustuu ohjuksen moottorin muodostaman pilven lämpö-
säteilyyn. Säteily kuitenkin muuttuu lennon eri vaiheissa, mikä tuottaa haasteita järjestelmälle. 
Millimetrialueen tutkan käyttö varoittimen sensorina on myös yksi vaihtoehto. Laser-varoittimet 
toimivat koko sillä taajuusalueella, mitä sotilaskäytössä tulenjohtamiseen ja ohjusten ohjaamiseen 
käytetään. Tutkavaroittimen tutkimus on vielä kesken. 
Löydettyjä tuloksia analysoimalla tulen tässä vaiheessa hieman ristiriitaisiin tuloksiin. Lämpösäteilyn 
käytön suurin haaste on sen eteneminen ilmakehässä. Varoittimen tavoitekaan ei ole toimia 
kymmentä kilometriä pidemmälle. Yksi mahdollinen ratkaisu on suunnitella ja toteuttaa raketti, jonka 
tuottaa lämpösäteilyä kuten tietty puolustavan joukon käytössä oleva ohjus. Jos koneessa on kuitenkin 
myös millimetrialueen tutka tukemassa varoitusjärjestelmää, hankaloituu rakettiharhautus 
merkittävästi, koska sen pitäisi oletettavasti olla lentokoneen kanssa melko tarkasti kohtaavalla 
reitillä. Laser-varoitin on ilmeisesti herkin järjestelmistä, koska se voi tietyissä olosuhteissa ja 
varsinkin matalalla lentokorkeudella aiheuttaa paljon vääriä hälytyksiä ilman tarkoituksellista 
harhauttamista. Laserin käyttö yhdistettynä raketin laukaisuun saattaisi tuottaa halutun tuloksen. 
Tutkavaroittimen harhautus onnistuu, jos valelaitteen signaali on uskottavan tarkka. 
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SYMBOLS AND ABBREVATIONS 
Symbol /  
Abbreviation 
Nomenclature Units 
AC Alternating Current  
A/D Analog-to-Digital Converter  
AOA Angle-Of-Arrival  
ARM Anti-Radar (/Radiation) Missile  
CPU Central Processing Unit  
CVR Crystal Video Receiver  
CW Continuous Wave  
D/A Digital-to-Analog Converter  
DC Direct Current  
DR Dynamic Range  
DSB Double Sideband  
DSP Digital Signal Processor  
ECCM Electronic Counter-Counter Measure  
ECM Electronic Counter Measure  
EM Electromagnetic  
EMI Electromagnetic Interference  
EMS Electromagnetic Spectre  
ESM Electronic Warfare Support Measures  
EW Electronic Warfare  
EWSP Electronic Warfare Self-Protection (system)  
FAR False Alarm Rate  
FCR Fire Control Radar  
FM Frequency Modulation  
  Intensity  W/sr (Wsr-1) 
IF Intermediate Frequency  
  
IFM Instantaneous Frequency Measurement  
LBR Laser Beam Rider (missile)  
LO Local Oscillator  
LRF Laser Range Finder  
LWR Laser Warning Receiver  
MDS Minimum Detectable Signal  
MOE Measure Of Effectiveness  
MWR Missile Warning Receiver  
RWR Radar Warning Receiver  
sr steradian, SI-unit of solid angle  
TOA Time of Arrival  
VCO Voltage Controlled Oscillator  
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IMBUING AIR-THREAT – DISGUISE AS A PLOY TO DISTRACT 
AIRCRAFTS 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Today‘s theatre of war has changed radically from the times of Sun Tzu, nevertheless, many 
things remain the same. Strategy – the art of winning a war – has clearly an equal meaning 
historically and today, but the means to attain it have drastically changed. In the field of tac-
tics, we have come probably even closer to the means of Sun Tzu; battles in counterterrorism 
or counterinsurgency missions are nearly entirely deception and fraud from the hiding party‘s 
point of view.  
The main intent of my research is to prove that historical operations like Operation Overlord 
— the landing and occupation of Normandy — and many others would not be possible in 
today‘s battlefield the way they were accomplished historically. Radars would have given an 
early warning of the enemy‘s manoeuvers far at sea for the defender in Normandy.  
The biggest difference between war-machines is in, frankly, the sensors; including air, land 
and naval vehicles. The implementation of armour and armament of a tank has not changed 
significantly in the past decades. What has changed is the thickness and hardness of the ar-
mour and therefore the continuously developed armour penetrating munitions which has long-
er range. The warships have transformed into large missile carriers, and missiles most specific 
parts are the high-tech sensors: infrared sensors, radars, GPS-receivers etc. And the real focus 
in this research, the warplanes and helicopters, have gained more and more speed and ma-
noeuvrability by the development of the jet-engines, aerodynamics and fuselage design and 
construct. However, the most lethal thing about them as well is their weaponry — precise air-
to-air and air-to-ground missiles which apply the different uses of sensors; not to mention the 
sensors the aircraft itself is carrying with it on its radars, FLIRs or missile warning systems.  
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Contemporary war machines carry multiple sensors covering a great deal of the electromag-
netic spectre. It is nearly impossible to stay undetected on the ground though forces would be 
entrenched and camouflaged. At some point they will be noticed and usually this is eventually 
when a shot is fired by the ground troops or a signal sent from a radio transmitter or a radar. 
My key topic and point of interest in this research are the electronic warfare self-protection 
systems EWSP the warplanes and helicopters are carrying (in some sources also known as 
MWS = missile warning system or MAW = missile approach warning). The EWSP is used to 
detect and warn the pilot of the radiation of a laser or an air defence radar, or of an incoming 
missile which it has noticed. They are designed to warn the pilot, deploy the countermeasures 
accompanied with counter manoeuvres to prevent the missile hitting the plane. These missile 
warning systems sense different radiations from the environment. They detect these radiations 
if present, make calculations of the detection, try to identify the threat, and give the pilot a 
warning. Simultaneously they can even deploy the countermeasures, flares or chaff, if set to 
an automatic mode.  
At this point well-designed and managed disguise-attacks come into picture which will be my 
main task, as described later. With the help of multiple simultaneous false attacks it must be 
considerably more difficult for the enemy to define real attacks from decoys, which in turn 
makes actions against real threat a lot more fragmentary and difficult. In addition it must be 
very frustrating to the pilot to engage in the avoiding manoeuvres and wasting the counter-
measures if warning signals are flashing all the way. This brings a sort of small-scale PSYOP-
dimension to the means of distractions and his concentration on the mission is greatly dis-
turbed. I cannot resist to quote Colonel Andy Birdy from USARMY, who said during the op-
eration Uphold Democracy in Haiti  
“Psychological operations...have proven to be indispensable...it allowed us to apply a 
type of power without necessarily having to shoot bullets.[1] ” 
That said, before going any further to the research tasks and delimiting them, any greater val-
ue for PSYOPS than is needed in a technical research is not given.  
1.1 Research task 
The research task I have defined for this paper is straight forward: how to bring the surprise 
element back in the art of air defence warfare with the assistance of active electronic warfare. 
In The Air Force Doctrine Document 2-5.1 actions like these are named electronic deception 
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and they are defined as ―[deception] Utilizes the electromagnetic spectrum to confuse or mis-
lead an adversary.[2]‖ This thesis will not answer all the questions about the surprise-element 
on the battlefield, not even from the point-of-view of the ground based air-defence. In other 
words, the main research problem in my thesis is,  
- what are the best possibilities to succeed in deceiving the airborne electronic 
warfare self-protection systems?  
This research is not from any particular troop‘s point-of-view, but as general as it can be. 
Threats of aircraft, countermeasures against them, and deceptive actions searching possibili-
ties to imbue them are the most significant subjects in the text. Some air defence troops on the 
battlefield fighting as part of a virtual, non-specific army troops are used as examples a few 
times.  
My supplementary tasks are: 
- What is the electronic warfare related threat to a combat aircraft, and what 
kind of transmits and emissions it sends? 
- Which bands of electromagnetic spectre are covered with the different sen-
sors of EWSP system? 
- What are the observables of the receivers, and how do they discriminate a 
real threat from a false alarm? 
Other pressing questions after the conclusions made to the questions above are:  
- What type of machines could do the decoy‘s job and what kind of require-
ments for these machines should be given?  
- Does industrial devices already exist that could complete the mission with-
out being deciphered by the enemy? 
Determination of the bands the different sensors of a warplane are using will be practically 
solved rather simply. All that is needed is a few good sources of material considering the 
MWS in general and gathering the information about the basic principles of the MWS and 
what sectors of the EM-spectre they are using. After that shall be introduced more specific 
information about the state-of-the-art sensors, including their abilities and limitations. In the 
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end should be possible to claim how the EWSP system and the pilot could not be able to rec-
ognize the real attack from a false alarm. 
Clearly a challenge will be to find accurate data from up-to-date MWS-applications which are 
in operative use because of classifications. In the section where I‘m trying to meet the task of 
―how the MWSs discriminate the real threat from a false one‖ I need to make drastic conclu-
sions from the knowledge gathered from non-specific literature and other sources considering 
computer algorithms and electromagnetic radiation features.  
The last two problems to-be-solved follow in the conclusions made from the first chapters. 
This will be mainly requirements for a decoy to survive the cut: not to be recognized as a de-
coy. The industrial part of this paper shall remain a narrow sweep of what components or 
ready systems would the markets already have.  
1.2 Concepts, Points of view and Exclusion 
―Concepts are the constituents of thoughts. Consequently, they are crucial to such psychologi-
cal processes as categorization, inference, memory, learning, and decision-making. This much 
is relatively uncontroversial.‖[3] Still, the nature of concepts varies depending on what is the 
philosophy behind it and thus concepts have been the subject of much debate. Concepts are 
either mental representations – psychological entities – of a larger subject or just simply abili-
ties. The third philosophy is so called Frengean Sense, which --  
From the three variations above I have come to conclusion to think the concept of my paper as 
a mental representation of my subject being examined. I have touched my concepts briefly in 
earlier chapters and will have a more specific glance at them here. The concept of this re-
search is as follows: 
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If it is presumed, and so it should, that a target on the ground will be, at least by means of 
EW, found by air war machine over hostile ground and especially while on a DEAD/SEAD 
mission (destruction/suppression of enemy air defence), albeit they would be well camou-
flaged and hid, the probability of finding the real targets will be made somewhat more diffi-
cult if there would be even more of targets found than real targets – the real threats for attack-
planes or helicopters – exist. (Figure 1) 
Means of detecting these threats of an attack plane are many. Electronic reconnaissance is 
done with platforms solely built for this purpose or by electronic devices aboard the attack-
plane. I will concentrate more on the attack-planes, but reconnaissance planes are potentially 
equally affected by the ploy. A target can be detected from the emission of radar or laser, or 
from the launch of missile, which emits measurably and quite typically in the regions of visu-
al light, infra-red and ultraviolet regions, and can thus be used for the detection. [Figure 2]  
Figure 1: The concept: for the aircraft it is severely more difficult to certainly know 
when to start the countermeasures if the MWS is warning repeatedly. This gives the 
defender on the ground more cover for its actions. 
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Figure 2: The means of an attack-plane to detect threats on ground. 
When it‘s made difficult for the pilot to determine when the threat is real, the defender of the 
ground has significantly increased its probability to survive. This could occur other conse-
quences, as well: the aircrew could turn around, concentrate to decoy and miss the real threat, 
or even firing towards the decoy. When the MWS indicates Calculations for the probability 
are presented later.  
The line between active and passive decoy in my paper is drawn between either the decoy 
transmits radiation of any sort by purpose, and which is the key to deception of it, or not. 
Dummy rockets, which come to picture when trying to alert the sensors seeking for missile 
launch, are in the twilight zone. They are not electronic transmitters, but their main purpose is 
to create infra-red and ultra-violet radiation plausibly. My point of view is strictly in the ac-
tive disguise. I will not concentrate in passive decoys, which are a topic for a whole other pa-
per.  
Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) will be my one of my methods in the search of data and 
usage of sensors. Practically, this means the usage of IHS Jane‘s database and usage of many 
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different military magazines. Using the internet as source has it place when finding first clues 
about new subjects.  
As the paper progresses to its Analyse chapter, I will present different solutions for making 
these disguise-attacks. One preliminary assumption I have beforehand: I believe large enough 
rockets are possible for this application. I have found out that in the UK they are in use for 
testing purposes. Despite being a very interesting matter nothing came up with reasonable 
amount of search. 
1.3 Theoretical Context 
Theoretical context of this paper is difficult to outline. In the centre are the electronic warfare 
self-protection systems that are designed to warn the flight-crew of helicopter or aircraft 
against a variety of threats in the battlefield that could occur during a mission. Laser beam, 
radar radiation, and a launch of a surface-to-air missile are the ones to be noticed with ad-
vantage taken from the electromagnetic spectre.  They are the threats that are extremely lethal, 
or their existence in the moment could lead to hazardous incidents later. More time to react is 
acquired by noticing the presence of the threat earlier. The three indications of threats men-
tioned above are the easiest ones to pick from noise, and thus most useful from the aircrafts 
point of view. And the big picture of electronic warfare (EW) and its operational functions [4] 
come into question when talking about electromagnetic spectre, including the electronic at-
tack (EA), the electronic protection (EP) and the electronic support (ES) with the signals intel-
ligence and their interactions as visualized by Alm in Figure 3. Electronic deception as a 
greater entirety of military deception is, however, an equivalent action on the list of command 
and control (C2) warfare actions: 
- Operation security (OPSEC), 
- EW, 
- Psychological operations (PSYOPS), 
- Military deception, and  
- Physical destruction [5]. 
PSYOPS was noticed briefly in the first chapter, but deserves no more attention later, because 
of it not including into the theoretical context or research task. It is an additional advantage, in 
size of single pilot or squadron, that might occur, and has its place as part of an more psycho-
logical research. 
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Missile warning systems are systems-of-systems; they are more than the sum of their subsys-
tems abilities. Sensors and data processing units, which calculate the data coming from the 
sensors, are the subsystems going to have most attention in this paper. The sensors acquire the 
data of signals directed to the target plane, or at least are visible to it; the data processing units 
(DPU) most value is from its ability to define the real threat-demonstrative signals from false 
alarms. Getting deep into the DPU‘s methods could become overwhelming, and I might have 
to leave it to minor interest. MWS‘s operative capabilities are commercial secrets hard to find 
accurate data from. All that is possible to do is to model their work by studying the proce-
dures of computer algorithms, and doing strict speculation from them. Other subsystems are 
not in the centre of interest in my research, and thus will be left to minor focus. 
Figure 3: Operational functions in electronic warfare and sectors closely related to 
EW. [4] In a version of the same functions on De Martinos‟ book [5] is longer lists un-
der the three headlines of EW, and „signals intelligence‟ is under the electronic sup-
port. ECM methods, where this paper is aiming to, are in two positions in his diagram. 
ECM could be thought to belong to either one of them: from this paper‟s questions‟ 
point-of-view is to answer in problems of deception, but the aim behind is to acquire 
more protection to the land based troop.  
To accomplish my research I have to what the threats of aircraft are, and how they are visible 
to aircrafts‘ sensors. After presenting these threats it‘s easier to the researcher, and reader, to 
understand the methods and meaning of the MWS and requirements of the decoy. The main 
Electronic warfare
Strategic 
intelligence
Electronic 
attack (EA)
Electronic 
support (ES)
Electronic 
protection (EP)
EW support
Signals
intelligence
EM spectrum
control
 9 
 
 
task of this research is, in other words, to find the relevant features of the land-based air-
defence equipment that could possibly rather easily and plausibly imitated, and thus acquire 
desired reactions in the aircraft and its crew. The theoretical context from the point-of-view is 
this paper is shown in Figure 4.  
 
Figure 4: The theoretical context of EW from point-of-view of this research. This 
sketch was made in the very beginning of the process, and long before deeper 
knowledge of the subject was evolved in the mind of the researcher. It is not 
misleadig in any way, but it‟s little abridged for to be used alone.  
1.4 Methods 
Doing a theoretical literary research of a pragmatic subject is a difficult task in different lev-
els. Aware and justifiable ontological decision is something different than just a thought. Still 
mostly they are mere notions without any deeper understanding. Basis of the research must be 
on solid ground. Doing an academic research always includes some basic presumptions or 
philosophical commitments. These are facts on which the process of the research is based on. 
This is true even in a very pragmatic research or when the research aims to work-oriented 
solutions usable in everyday life. It applies even though the theoretical basis would be some-
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what shallow, just like it was in the beginning of this paper. [7] When this research had begun 
about 18 months earlier than it was finally ready these presumptions and predictions seemed 
very distant. This research is built logically from the basis to the answers of the research ques-
tions. Many things are taken granted in everyday life – and sometimes in academic research, 
as well. Taking reader‘s knowledge as granted has been avoided, as is a good academic cus-
tom [8]. Still some background in the basics of military tactics and especially electronic war-
fare might come handy.  
This paper has been made as a literature research [9]. Some elements of system analysis has 
considered. All the sources are public, yet not everyone in the reach of all readers. Most data 
from the sources is collected in the third chapter, which is presenting the technology of warn-
ing systems, and physics involved with them. Answers were found with deductive analysis: 
inferences were made from the information gathered in the two data chapters ahead of the 
analysis when the research was reaching towards the completion of the main tasks. In the line 
between qualitative and quantitative research this falls very close to the qualitative end. Final 
discussion reconciles the entity.  
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2 THREATS SYSTEMS 
2.1 Threat systems 
2.1.1 Overview 
According to STANAG 2999 [11], the threats to helicopters in land operations are air defense 
weapons (i.e. small arms, anti-aircraft artillery, and air defense guided missiles), tank main 
armament, anti-tank guided missiles, field artillery, tactical aircraft, armed helicopters, EW, 
and NBC warfare. [12] Robert E. Ball [13] has made a substantially more complete list of the 
threats for helicopters in battlefield, shown in Figure 5. Though the figure is made of threats 
concerning the helicopters I have no reason why not to count the same threats have an impact 
on larger group of different aircraft. I have dropped out some insignificant threats considering 
this paper. 
 
Figure 5: Helicopter threat types, via Heikell [11]. Legend: MBT = Main Battle Tank, 
SPAAG = Self Propelled Anti-Aircraft Gun, DEW = , CLOS = Command Line-of-sight. 
 12 
 
 
2.1.2 Non-terminal threat systems 
Non-terminal threat systems augment the effectiveness of terminal weapon systems. They 
provide acquisition, identification and tracking of the target and distribute this information to 
weapon platforms. They can also lower the helicopter‘s efficiency through means of electron-
ic warfare. Thus, non-terminal threat system does not constitute the aircraft a threat per se. 
These threads, more specific listing in table, are very significant considering my research and 
will acquire more specific consideration later in the paper. A summarization of non-terminal 
threats is made in Table 1.[11] 
Table 1: Summary of most important non-terminal threats to helicopters (cf. Figure 
XX) via Heikell. [11] Heikell was interested in his paper solely on the threats of heli-
copters in the battlefield, which is rather easy to decide from his notation on his work, 
and especially this table. However, many of these non-terminal threats can be con-
ceived on aircraft, as well.  
System task Systems/methods Features 
Search and ac-
quisition 
Active uni- or multistate 
radar systems, passive 
SIGINT and ESM systems, 
IRST and other EO sys-
tems, acoustic helicopter 
detectors, human observa-
tion. Airborne systems in-
creasingly used for en-
hanced coverage 
Radar frequencies from VHF to X-
band(IEEE std), multitude of modula-
tions and search schemes, transmit 
powers from sub-Watt to MWs. ESM 
and SIGINT systems covering HF 
through Ka-vand, with sensitivities 
below -100dBm. EO systems covering 
the visual 12 µm band. Aural detec-
tors sensitive in the lower frequency 
range of helicopter rotor noise. 
Identification Cooperative through active 
IFF systems; non-
cooperative by radar iden-
tification, EO systems 
and/or visual observation 
or identification of emis-
sions by ESM systems. 
Encrypted IFF interrogations and re-
sponds at designated frequencies. 
Non-cooperative systems through 
signal processing in search / acquisi-
tion sensors, supported by emitter 
libraries. Radar ID of turbine and rotor 
modulations or target glint pattern. EO 
ID through pattern recognition. Hybrid 
ID methods for enhanced effective-
ness. 
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2.1.3 Terminal threats 
As is shown in the Figure 5, terminal threats, threats that try to have an terminal impact on 
airborne craft can be subcategorized in static and mobile systems. In here the terms mobile 
and static could be a little misleading. Basically all weapon systems are counted as mobile 
systems though they are very static when operating. If a static object is solid it could end up 
being a lethal threat to helicopters and other aircraft flying on low altitudes: smokestacks, 
hills, communication link antennas, etc. Relevant battlefield intelligence with attention to ter-
rain are basic precautions needed to pilot a helicopter through safely. Helicopter mines are the 
most noticeable tactical static weapon. Other aircraft don‘t have threats as mines to threaten 
their mission anymore, but historically barrage balloons used to act as such. They have been 
obsolete since the Second World War. [11] 
The threats falling under headline ―Mobile‖ are various, hence not all remarkable according to 
the research tasks of my thesis. Such are: Small arms and RPGs; artillery and MBTs; and 
most from the groups anti-aircraft guns and SPAAG. In the same class, mobile, are all of the 
naval and airborne threats, and I will not attend them any interest, as well. [11] 
Tracking Software tracking functions 
of search radars and EO 
sensors. Combined search 
and track with ESA and 
track mode of airborne ra-
dars. Dedicated track (fire 
control) by mechanically 
steered antennas. Triangu-
lations by SIGINT or ESM 
for rough track. Track by 
human observation. 
Track function in traditional search 
radar as a display feature; in EO sen-
sors tracking is by signal processing 
and pattern recognition or human as-
sisted. ESA radars can switch be-
tween search and track and have no 
fixed spatial scheme; present fighter 
aircraft radars mechanically lock their 
antenna for tracking, as does dedicat-
ed fire control radars. Monopulse 
tracking dominates modern radars. 
Triangulation with cooperating or air-
borne systems.  
C3 Mobile ground/air/space 
communication systems; 
not a point-of-interest of 
this paper. 
Radio or wire communications. 
EW Electronic countermeas-
ures against helicopter 
radar and communication 
systems. 
Saturation and / or deceptive jamming 
to degrade helicopter‟s effectiveness 
as a combat asset.  
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2.1.3.1 Anti-aircraft guns and SPAAG 
In my concept-chapter I introduced my idea of producing radar-like radiation as one of the 
methods of imbuing the aircraft. When speaking of the threats of an aircraft one of the very 
dangerous ones is the sub-group ‗radar-guided guns‘. When combining the precision of a 
tracking radar to the fire-rate and accuracy to close-distance of a gun, you achieve a system of 
high lethality to targets flying low. Atop them, AA guns have better multi-target capability 
than missiles and with guns it‘s easier to sustain a non-penetrable barrage around a point tar-
get to protect it. [11] 
SPAAG vehicles often carry both search and track radars, and the gun is gyro stabilized for 
firing in the move. A new variation of SPAAGs is to add short-range missiles on them, which 
increases their range and the number of targets that can be engaged. [11] Table 2 and Table 3 
show details of some examples of AA guns and SPAAG systems.  
The aspect of radar guided AA guns from the deceptive point-of-view is revisited in the ana-
lyze chapter. 
Table 2: Specifications for some AA gun systems. via Heikell.[11] Legend: F/T = 
Fragment - timed, AP/T = Armor piercing - timed, m(v) = meter vertical. 
  
S-60 Bofors L/70 
Skyshield 35 
AHEAD 
Country of origin Russia Sweden Switzerland 
Caliber 57 mm 40 mm 35 mm 
Muzzle velosity 1000 m/s 1000+ m/s -- 
FCS Radar/Optica Radar/Optica Remote only 
Rate of fire (/barrel) 105-120 rds/min 260 rds/min 1000 rds/min 
Elevation/Depression +87°/-2° +90°/-4° -- 
Traverse 360° 360° -- 
Drive type Servo/Manual Electrohydaulic Electrical 
Effective range 4000-6000 m(v) 3000-4000m -- 
Ammuntion F/T, AP/T Numerous AHEAD 
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Comment Produced from 
1950 to 1957 
Entered service in 
1951 
Ready for pro-
duction 
Table 3: Specifications of some IR guided MANPADSs, via Heikell.[11]  
  Gepard 2S6M Tunguska LvKV-90 
Country of origin International Russia Sweden 
Caliber 2 * 35 mm 2 * 30 mm 40 mm 
Missiles -- 9M311 (SA-19) No 
Sensors 
S/T-rdr, EO, LRF 
S/T-rdr, EO, opti-
cal 
T-rdr, EO, optical, 
LRF 
Gun / Missile 
range 
3000 m 4000/8000 m -- 
Max. Missile 
speed 
-- 900 m/s -- 
IFF Yes Yes (1RL138) -- 
Comment Missile upgrade 
developed 
  CV-90 chassis 
Legend: S/T-rdr = Search / Track radar, T-rdr = Track radar. 
2.1.3.2 Missiles 
Missiles are a threat to helicopters, if it can operate at low altitudes, but for a warplane they 
are a threat almost invariably. MANPAD missiles alone have been built in so big numbers 
that they will be encountered in any scenario throughout the world. Table xx shows details of 
some common IR guided MANPAD missiler; LBR and CLOS missiles are in Table 4. 
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Table 4: Specifications of some IR guided MANPADSs, via Heikell. [11] Legend: FM 
= Frequency modulation 
  Mistral 1 Igla  FIM-92B/C Stinger 
Country of origin Europe Russia USA 
Min/Max slant 
range 
300/6 000 m 500/5200 m 200/4800 m 
Min/Max eff. Alti-
tude 
5/3000 m 10/3500 m >0/3800 m 
Seeker 2-4/3,5-5 µm 1,5-2,5/3-5 µm FM 
tracking 
0,3-0,4/3,5-5 µm 
Preparation time -- 6 s -- 
Speed M2,5 max M2+ M2.2 
Burn-out/self-
destruct 
2,5 s/14 s -- -- 
Warhead 1 kg HE 1,27 kg HE 1 kg HE 
Fuze Impact & laser 
proximity 
Impact/Delay Time delay impact 
Comment ECCM through 
push-up /-down 
9K38 (SA-18), FM 
seeker 
Produced also in 
Europe 
Medium and long-range surface-to-air missile systems provide a threat to helicopters when 
flying at elevated heights, and other aircraft usually constantly in the battlefield. They could 
make a threat to helicopters at low altitudes, if the mask from terrain is scarce. Medium and 
long-range missile system demonstrated in Table 5. 
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Table 5: Specification of some medium and long-range surface-to-air missile sys-
tems, via Heikell.[11] Legend: HEF = high-explosive fragmentation, HEB/F = high-
explosive blast/fragmentation, S/A = semi-active, SC = shaped charge, TVM = track 
via missile. 
  ASRAD-R Crotale NG S-400 Patriot 
Country of origin Germany, Sweden France Russia USA 
Max effective range 8000 m 11000 m 120-400 km 70 km 
Min/Max eff. Alti-
tude 
<0/5000 m --/6000 m 185 km 60/>24000 m 
Sensors X-band 8.8-9.3 
GHz,24 frequen-
cies, FLIR, TV, 
LRF  
102-2,4 GHz PD 
S-rdr, 16,0-16,4 
GHz monopulse 
PD T-rdr 
"panoramic radar 
and multifunction 
radar",  
C-band ESA S/T-
rdr and up-/down-
links 
Guidance 
LBR Radio command 
Inertial with S/A 
terminal homing 
S/A TVM 
Speed M2 -- M12 M5 
Warhead SC/HEF 13 kg HEF -- 91 kg HEB/F 
Fuze Impact & laser 
proximity 
Impact & proximity -- Ka-band proximity 
Comment In use in Finland In use in Finland   PAC-1 
 
2.2 Threat technology 
2.2.1 Overview 
A more detailed analysis of the technologies used by threats of an aircraft is needed before the 
countermeasures can be presented. Figure 6 summarizes these technologies. This chapter will 
shortly describe how the missiles find their way to their target. The technologies used in guid-
ance units of different missiles will be presented. Concentration is in methods and technolo-
gies which are not silent in the matter of EMS, but which radiate so that the EWSP could de-
tect the use of the threat. This means practically laser beam-rider technology. Other big topic 
is the principals of radar technology. These both subjects, and radars, make the biggest signif-
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icance of this whole paper from the ploy‘s point-of-view. It is rather difficult to imitate some-
thing electronically if the example doesn‘t radiate either.  
Figure 6: Summary of threat technologies of importance to airborne EWSP-
systems.[11] The sensors transmitting are not quite informatively displayed in the 
diagram, but briefly: EO sensors don‟t emit or transmit at all; tracking radars, semiac-
tive radars (homing), and active radars (homing) are transmitting, but the rest of the 
RF sensors are silent in this matter; guidance systems here mean truly the system 
that transmit in the EMS to hit their target, so they belong to the transmitting pool of 
technologies. 
2.2.2 EO-sensors 
2.2.2.1 IR sensors and seeker technology 
Imaging technology is a group which consists of low-light television (LLTV) cameras, image 
intensifiers, and infrared cameras of various types. Naval applications are the main user of 
LLTV cameras, and short-range systems of the image intensifiers. Both systems are very 
competent in doing their task but lack interest as subject for this paper for a very evident rea-
son: they don't radiate in any way thus they cannot be placed by a distraction. Other points of 
views are needed. [11] 
Missile warning receivers (MWR) are developed For the purpose of noticing the missile 
launch. The aircraft cannot be distracted in any other way than building a dummy, and dum-
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mies were not in the interest of this research. Possible ploy could be, though, achieved 
through simulating the missile launch itself. Distracting the missile launch warning is dealt 
with in later Analyze chapter. [11] 
2.2.2.2 Laser technology and guidance 
Lasers are part of helicopter threat systems in the form of laser range finders (LRF), semi-
active target designators, guidance beams for LBR missiles, and laser fuses. Most significant 
difference between the LRF and LBR systems is the pulse repetition frequency (PRF) and 
pulse energy: the LRF uses typically medium-energy, low PRF lasers and LBR-systems use 
low-energy, high PRF (up to some 10 kHz) devices.[11] 
Numerous wavelengths are possible for use in different lasers but only a few are used in prac-
tice. For instance, CO2 lasers operate usually at 10.6 µm in the mid-IR band, but CO2 lasing 
has been demonstrated at least for the 8.9–12.4 µm band. The real backbone of military lasers 
are the Nd:YAG (neodymium-doped yttrium aluminum garnet) lasers at 1.064 µm wave-
length, at the near-IR band. [11]  
 
Figure 7: Laser wavelengths of most interest: CO2 at 10.6 µm; Nd:YAG at 1.064 
µm;. Other wavelengths are also visible, though not maybe important from the mili-
tary perspective, of for this research. [14] 
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LBR missiles laser receiver is in the rear, facing at the behind to the source of the laser beam. 
The receivers are therefore generally assumed immune to jamming. Hence, the radiation is 
pointed directly towards the target, which accordingly means it could be easily detected. 
However, just after the launch the beam has to be broadened, which lowers the beam power 
density at the target and its sensors, and could cause delay in the detection of the radiation and 
its source. [11] 
2.2.3 RF sensors 
Radio frequency sensors can be divided into two main groups from the aircrafts point of view: 
passive electronic support measure (ESM) and signal intelligence (SIGINT) implements and 
their sensors, and emitting RF sensors. The passive sensors cannot be detected by the other 
side, so once again I leave them out of this paper. In addition, emitting sensors are one of the 
most important subjects in the research, like noted before. 
It has been said that ―-- every ECM system should be designed to counter the threat to the 
specific craft to be protected, not every radar in the general area.[15]‖ This had been brought 
to usage after the 1973 Yom Kippur where the 2K12 Kub/Kvadrant and the ZSU-23-4 were 
successful. Western militaries focused for a long time on the emitters of those systems. In 
Heikell‘s opinion the notation above is not quite up-to-date anymore. [11] Since 1982 Falk-
land war, where British aircraft were fighting under the threat of French Exocet missiles, the 
―western‖ forces have fought against western military technology. The same had been with 
Soviet troops in Afghanistan. The ―rainbow threat‖ of almost any possible weapon system is 
reality in international operations. Only in the national level of small countries the single 
threat scenario is plausible [11]. The Table 6 below will give a general review of radar param-
eters of importance to helicopter EWSP, and is quite well broadened to be used with aircraft 
as well.  
Table 6 is also an important source of information to add in the chapter . It is still well justi-
fied to keep it here because of it vital information of the radar threats. At the same time it pro-
vides excellent summary of the radar RF signal observables, which are more discussed in ra-
dar warning receiver chapter. 
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Table 6: Radar parameter considerations of importance to EWSP and survivability via 
Heikell. Legend: CPI=coherent processing interval, IBW=instantaneus BW, 
ICW=intermittent CW, LFM=linear frequency modulation, SLB=sidelobe blanking, 
SLC=sidelobe cancellation, τ=pulse/code element legth. For more information about 
matters presented here, refer to chapter 4.4 Radar Warning Receivers. 
Parameter Importance Parameter range 
Carrier frequen-
cy 
Single most important 
parameter for radar 
identification 
The 2-18 GHz band most important to EWSP. 
Tracking radars increasingly usa Ka-band, 
and weapon seekers the W-band. Frequen-
cies <2 GHz increasingly cluttered by civil 
emitters. X-band contains e.g. the bulk of civil 
navigation radars. 
PRF PRF ranks second most 
important parameter for 
radar identification. 
PRF from <1 kHz (search radars) to 1 MHz 
(PD missile seekers). Fixed, staggered, or 
completely random (in MTI radars). 
Pulse width Third most important 
parameter for rad identi-
fication. Related to BW 
and PRF. 
Pulse lengths from <0.1 µs to >10 µs. Duty 
cycles from 0.1 %, and up to 50 % for ICW 
operation. Risk for PW corruption by multipath 
propagation. 
Scan type Mechanical scan: indi-
cates threat‟s intension 
and is a target for de-
ception. ESA antennas 
complicate the situation. 
Circular or sector scan (0.2–2 Hz) for search 
radars. Intermittent for tracking radars in ac-
quisition phase, and virtually constant when 
locked. Random looks by ESA radars. 
Power Determines power den-
sity at the receiver, 
which is a main issue to 
detection. 
Transmit powers from <1 W (FMCW) to the 
MW class (high-power pulsed search radars). 
EWSP receivers can see any power density 
depending on the range to the radar.  
Bandwidth (BW) Puts similar require-
ments on the EWSP 
receiver. 
Pulses shorter than 0.1 µs require >10 MHz 
IBW. Frequency agility up to 10 % of carrier 
frequency. (BW ~ 1/τ) 
Digital beam-
forming (DBF) 
DBF allows beam nulls 
to be placed in the di-
rection of a jammer. 
True DBF by ESA antenna, pseudo-DBF 
(SLB/SLC) by added auxiliary antenna(s). 
Jamming suppression -20–-30 dB, with poten-
tial for more.  
Polarization Influences antenna 
losses and is needed as 
a jamming parameter. 
Any polarization must be expected. Antenna 
cross polarization (-25 <-40 dB of main polari-
zation direction) is an avenue for jamming.  
Coherence Introduces requirements 
on jamming coherence. 
Depends on victim radar‟s CPI and stability of 
its local oscillator. 
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Coverage Determines whether a 
target will be detected or 
not. 
Detection requires that spatial and temporal 
search conditions are satisfied; frequency 
domain influences lobe properties and hence 
the space. 
It is obvious that the parameters shown above will show a significant importance in this re-
search. They will be pointed back to in later in the paper, when dealing with the radar warning 
receivers in chapter 4.4.  
2.3 Discussion 
Clarifying example of the emissions of the target on the ground, or airborne and at the sea, is 
in Figure 8, and as it clearly brings out the targets can be visible on ground radiate in two dif-
ferent ways: either they radiate themselves, or reflect radiation coming from other source; 
background, target illuminating device, sun, et cetera. The reflected radiation is regarded, and, 
as said before, the interest is in the radiation transmitted, or emitted by the target or the threat 
on the ground.  
For a memory reference, the supplementary task which this chapter was searching answers to 
was: What is the electronic warfare related threat to a combat aircraft, and what kind of 
transmits and emissions it sends? To answer the question more completely than just with the 
Figure 8, there is a brief table next to present the most important observables of the targets —
or threats, depending on the point of view, here threat more implicit— on the ground. 
Table 7. A selection of the transmitted threat signals. 
Threat … and a selection of its possible observables 
AAA and SPAAG - laser range-finder 
- Radar signal (if exists), can be determined as FCR by its 
“radar locking” and mechanical scan on target. [Table 6] 
SAM - heat propagation of the missile plume, and/or the sur-
face of the skin 
- RF guidance signals (CLOS, TVM) 
- radar signals (active/semi-active radar homing, ACLOS) 
- laser range-finder 
- laser guidance (LBR) 
Radar [See Table 6] 
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This chapter gave a very short and not very detailed picture of airplanes‘ and helicopters‘ 
threats on the surface. Due to the more important issues, research questions and priorities of 
this paper, these are not addressed in this study further. Later chapters will continue, however, 
the discussion of threats because of separating them completely from the receiver technology 
is almost impossible. The next section explores the literature of the EWSP receivers, and it 
will include mainly information about the properties of those receivers, about how they work, 
but it will also include more specific data of the observables of the radiation each different 
receiver is trying to seek from the threats in the atmosphere surrounding the aircraft. EWSP 
systems are part of the study in terms of the most significant, and seeks nearly-tymään The 
main research question answers. 
Figure 8: Electromagnetic radiation reflected from the target or caused by the target. 
Source: Kosola & Solante [16], via Rantakari [17] 
 
Electromagnetic
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3 RECEIVER SYSTEMS OF EWSP 
3.1 The purpose of EWSP 
Warning system‘s function is to detect approaching or  threats and to alert the protected entity 
about a near-term danger, which could mean a nation, aircraft, ship, ground vehicle or soldier. 
A typical scenario where warning systems act involves (1) a platform, or area, to be protected; 
(2) an immediate danger; and (3) an environment containing a variety of benign objects or 
events that must be distinguished from the potential threat. Usually a warning system is never 
off-line, covers a wide range of the electromagnetic spectre and covers a broad range of threat 
parameters. [18] Heikell has made a well demonstrative figure (Figure 9) from the events and 
actions in the EWSP countermeasure process. For a reminder, this paper will contribute only 
in the part where the EWSP detects and tries to identify the signals as a real threat. Other pro-
cesses are only mentioned.  
Figure 9: Events and actions in the EWSP countermeasure process, and major fac-
tors involved in the process. The influence of CMs and maneuvers on threats is 
shown as a feedback loop.[11] 
Warning the platform involves continuous observation of the environment surrounding the 
platform, detection and recognition of threats, knowledge of the detailed characters of all the 
possible threats, and alerting the platform. To avoid false alarms the characterization must be 
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of high reliability, and it‘s crucial for engaging the appropriate countermeasures or other ac-
tions. After the warning system has done its work and alerted the platform of the forthcoming 
threat, recognized and located it, the subsequent defensive actions are a matter of other ele-
ments of the platforms self-defence, just as pictured above.[18] 
Two main missile threats for an airborne platform can be detected through their laser radiation 
signature or passive signature. Passive signature is the emitted radiation from heating and 
exhaust products. The missile itself produces heat from friction between its hull and fins and 
the atmosphere it‘s travelling through at its usually 2–4 Mach speed.  
Next sub-chapters will deal with these main methods each: the missile warning receiver 
(MWR), laser warning receiver (LWR), and radar warning receiver (RWR).   
3.2 Missile warning receivers – Taking Advance of the Infrared and Ultraviolet 
bands for Detecting Approaching Missiles 
At first in these sub-chapters is introduced the passive missile warning receivers (MWR) from 
all sensors. First subchapter deals with the features of receivers, and their measures of effec-
tiveness. In the second chapter is introduction to the observables of the MWRs. The missile 
plume is the key for a passive MWR to detect threats, and focus in this chapter is solely on 
them, such as AN/AAR-44A shown in Picture 1.  
Notice, that missile warning systems taking advantage of active radar in detection of threats, 
like Israeli Rafael‘s Trophy [19] or French Thales‘ MWS-20 [21], are limited out of this pa-
per. Advantage of those systems is undeniably their ability to detect threats regardless of the 
missiles burnout conditions. This regardless of the presumable factor that those active systems 
could be interfered like an air-surveillance radar. Still, a short description of the active sys-
tems is included here. What is in common with land vehicle and airborne active radar missile 
warning systems is the calculation: they detect the threat approaching the platform, and ―per-
form direction-of-arrival, time-to-impact and missile range, speed and bearing calculations‖ 
whether the projectile, missile or RPG, is going hit or cause danger to it. Many systems see 
much more than on what they take action on, or at least that‘s what they are presumably de-
signed to do, and not be bluffed with possible threats that are not going hit it. This is actually 
a major reason why active radar based systems are excluded from this paper. Some methods 
must be cut out, and this is it. 
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MWRs differ from the other sensors in its philosophy: it‘s not capturing radiation which is 
transmitted on purpose, but only emitted heat, visible, and ultraviolet radiation from the mis-
sile‘s plume, and skin parts that heat from friction. At this point the idea of distracting a pas-
sive MWR seems to become an overwhelming task to succeed because of its nature to search 
of certain kind of emitted radiation but, nevertheless, the process will be unveiled here and 
solutions shall be tried to be found. 
 
Picture 1: AN/AAR-44A missile warning system. A sample of a MWR that is capable 
of multicolor IR detection technology for what Jane‟s calls “a 'positive' missile warning 
with a 'minimum' false alarm rate”. System features include: with (left to right) control 
display unit, conical detector head and processor. It can detect multiple threats simul-
taneously with better than 1° angular detection. AN/AAR-44 can automatically visual-
ize and give audial warnings of the threats, and command the countermeasures. The 
upgraded AN/AAR-44B is described by manufacturer as providing even longer 
range,and “threat verification against both air-to-air and surface-to-air missiles.” 
Source: Jane‟s [20] 
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3.2.1 Features of missile warning systems and measures of effectiveness 
Many types of warning equipment and scenarios exist, if looking from a wide angle. These 
include such devices as fire alarms, nuclear reactor safety alarms, and laser radars. Still, in 
this paper will be introduced only the ones involved with warning the platform, aircraft, about 
an attack in process from adversary platform. In the cases treated herein, the emission of visu-
al, infra-red, or laser radiation are characterizing the attack. Warning receivers can be divided 
into tactical and strategic groups in almost every part of EMS they are working in. If the re-
ceiver is mounted on aircraft or any other vehicle and its purpose is to protect that individual 
vehicle, and maybe the closest ones, it is very clearly a tactical system. The threat is usually a 
terminal threat such as a surface-to-air missile attacking the protected vehicle itself or other 
troops and/or vehicles nearby. A satellite-borne IR-receiver, which is designed to detect inter-
continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) is without a doubt considered a strategic system. [18] 
Missile warning receivers have traditionally been working in the IR-region and taken advance 
of the inadvertent emissions from the threat missile. Contemporary warning receivers are 
working in the wide optical spectrum from the ultraviolet to the far infrared region. MWRs 
most important region is still the mid- and long-wavelength infrared radiation from heated 
missile parts and exhaust products. [18] A warning system working only in a single area of 
EMS couldn‘t possibly be very efficient. MWRs work together with systems operating within 
the millimetre and microwave regions to give a cover as impenetrable as possible. The spec-
tral nomenclature used in this work is in Table 8. Table lists some measures of effectiveness 
(MOEs), that are best associated with MWRs. There are also defined the typical and desirable 
values of the MOEs. 
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Table 8: Spectral nomenclature used in this chapter and later in paper. Via Wilmot 
.[18] 
Band name Wavelength 
(micrometers) 
Vacuum ultraviolet 0.05  0.20 
Short ultraviolet (UV-C) 0.20 - 0.29 
Solar blind ultraviolet 0.25 - 0.28 
Middle wave ultraviolet (UV-B) 0.29 - 0.32 
Long wave ultraviolet (UV-A) 0.32 - 0.40 
Visible 0.40 - 0.70 
Near infrared (NIR) 0.70 - 2.0 
Short wave infrared 2.0 - 3.0 
Middle wave infrared (nominal 3-5 urn) 3.0 - 6.0 
Plume band 4.0 - 5.0 
Blue spike band 4.1 - 4.3 
Red spike band 4.3 - 4.6 
Long wave (far) infrared (nominal 8-12 ^m) 6.0 - 15.0 
Extreme infrared 15.0 - 100 
Near millimeter wave 100 - 1000 
Millimeter wave 1000  10 000 
*  
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Table 9: Measures of Effectiveness and typical or desirable values. [18] 
MOE Definition Typical or de-
sirable values 
PD Detection probability 0,95–0,99+ 
FAR False Alarm Rate 1,0–0,1 /hr 
FARn Noise induced FAR 10
-3–10-4 /hr 
FARc Clutter induced FAR 10
-1 /hr 
Rd Detection range 1–10 km 
Rdec Declaration range 1–10 km 
FOR Field of regard 0–360° az 
±45° el 
DOA Direction of arrival resolution ±45° az 
TTG(TTI) Time to go (impact) 1–30 s 
TTImax Warning time (maximum TTI) 2–30 s 
Vmc Missile closing velocity resolution ± 10 m/s 
Nm Number of missiles handled < 10 
Prioritization Ability to prioritize among multiple threats Yes 
Latency Processing time - detection to declaration 0,5 s 
Blanking Blank after detect or CM activation Yes 
NEI Noise equivalent irradiance (sensitivity) Band depend-
ent 
Altitude Min. & max. operating alts. 0–10 km 
Outputs Signals to human or CPU  
The efficiency of MWR-systems is achieved by knowing from which wavelengths of EMS is 
expected the radiation to be emitted from when a missile is launched and during its flight. 
Missiles do generate very characteristic emission in the optical bands. They are inadvertent, 
and very vital for the detection of the missile. Water vapour and carbon dioxide molecules 
account for much of the exhaust emission. The well-known bands from C02 and H20 are 4.3 
and 2.7 µm, but in addition there are a wealth of transitions in the visible and ultraviolet spec-
tral bands. Some of these originate from the fuel constituents. A few of the more common line 
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emissions found in missile plumes are listed in . Atmospheric transmission properties, detec-
tor and optics technology, and background and clutter levels influence the practical use of any 
of these optical emissions for warning purposes.  
Table 10: Common Plume Spectral Lines [18] 
Wavelength 
(µm) 
Origin Comments 
15 CO2  
6.3 H2O Intense, heavy attenuation 
4.9 CO2  
4.3 CO2 Intense, moderate transmission 
2.7 H2O Intense, heavy attenuation 
2.7 CO2  
2.0 CO2  
1.87 H2O  
1.38 H2O  
1.14 H2O  
The look angle from the target, here airplane, affects the probability of detecting the missile. 
A missile on proportional navigation is always seen at a constant look angle from the target 
and a command-line-of-sight (CLOS) missile appears always lined up with the same point on 
the ground. Regarding to Pollock et al. ―The latter are more difficult to detect because they 
remain fixed with respect to the background clutter features. The variations in signature re-
sulting from changing look angle may deceive warning receiver signal processors that depend 
on intensity variations to deduce range and velocity.[18]‖  
3.2.2 Observables – what the MWR is looking out for 
IREO Systems Handbook notes that ―Missiles generate characteristic emissions in the optical 
bands that are inadvertent to their propulsion and vital to the detection and warning process. 
The most prominent of these are associated with the combustion of fuel during boost and sus-
tain phases.― [18] In addition to combustion related emissions the skin of the missile itself 
provides detectable radiation. There is a slight temperature difference between the skin of the 
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missile and its background, and the skin can reflect radiation, usually coming from the sun, 
and these two characters could prove to be even more robust indicators for the MWS than the 
emissions from the plume. The share of radiation coming either from the plume or the skin of 
the missile varies with the view angle throughout the trajectory of the missile. [18] Rantakari 
presents the four components of the observables for a MWR: 
- heating caused by atmospheric friction 
- reflected radiation 
- hot engine 
- exhaust gases (the plume). [17] 
An approximate missile exhaust temperature is 2000 K for a kerosene and liquid oxygen, and 
the radiant intensity in the C02 plume band for a vehicle of this type is typically 10
6
 W/sr, plus 
or minus an order of magnitude. If the missile uses solid fuels the signatures range between 
10
3
 W/sr and 10
4
 W/sr. Carbon particles may also be contained in the exhaust plume that emit 
at a temperature approximately equal to the exhaust gas temperature, and act as graybody 
emitters. [18] It is quite obvious that the radiation intensity of the missile signature depends 
on the type and size of its motor. To calculate the intensity of radiation in any of the optical 
bands the IREO systems handbook gives a few equations for calculating the intensity I in 
watts per steradian. First, rough and simple, equation for scaling missile signatures is 
       
where k depends on the spectral band. If the intensity is set proportional to the power of thrust 
the equation would be 
         
and the result will be more realistically scaled. In the Figure 11 is shown thrust versus time 
for several real missiles. The IREO handbook doesn‘t state any sources to the figure but I 
have no reason to doubt its value in this research and use. The main duty of it is to demon-
strate the fact that missiles thrust is not maintained constant through their flight. A scaling law  
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takes notice of the viewing angle and how it varies the observed signature. [18] Here the Ι90 is 
the intensity measured from 90° angle to the side of the missile‘s flight path, the viewing an-
gle. θ is the azimuth angle of the observed angle and ϕ is a small correction, an offset angle. 
Its value is dependent on the geometry of the missile and its plume. The arguments in the arti-
cle give the impression that the equation would apply only in cases where the missile is at the 
same altitude from the observer, that is, the point of view of the aircraft. My impression is that 
it could be used in situation where the azimuth angle from missile to the observer is zero, 
meaning it flies directly towards the target in two-dimensional meaning, but its altitude would 
be smaller or greater, and the altitude-angle would be used instead. In my point of view that‘s 
how it is and the IREO handbook only simplifies the equation. What is meaningful is the 
viewing angle to the flight path of the missile, not whether its to the side or to the top.  
I90
θ
ι
 
Figure 10: Radiation intensity of the missile plume. Ι90 is the intensity measured from 
90° angle to the side of the missile‟s flight path; .θ is the azimuth angle of the viewer; 
ι is the yaw angle, which doesn‟t have any effect to the calculations. [18]  
Visible waveband detection is, as mention before one of the methods to detect the threat mis-
sile. It may be based in two different sources of light: 1) the emitted light from the rocket 
plume or 2) from the missile body‘s scattered ambient light. In the first case is a lot similari-
ties to the infrared band, and the plume intensity is somewhat proportional to power of the 
thrust. In order to detect the missile in the visible region, as in the second case, there must be 
sufficient contrast in reflected ambient light between the missile and its background. The re-
flectances of the target missile depend on the outer surface of the missile skin. The surface 
may be painted in a way it reflects light as much as a natural background would, so to achieve 
as small contrast as possible. Usually the missiles are painted or coated with other protective 
material rather than just leave the skins polished bare metal visible. [18]  
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The knowledge that in the visible region it is possible to detect the incoming missiles brings a 
possibility of a new element to the thesis. At this point it is still too early to decide if I'll ex-
amine the subject as a one possibility of its own or report of it on the analysis chapter together 
with other regions which the EWSP utilizes. As early as in the introduction I considered the 
idea of using dummy rockets to draw the aircraft attention and cause a false alarm. For now I 
can say for sure that if they are to be used their requirements should include a maximum real-
like surface material or paint, just as their real examples, so that the EWSP would consider 
them as a real threat.  
 
Steady optical sources, such as battlefield fires, which can be difficult problems for a missile 
warning receiver, are readily rejected by the transient-oriented circuitry of typical laser warn-
ing receivers. [18]  
The third region of ESM that is possible to use in the missile detection is the ultraviolet band. 
IREO handbook shows how a certain jet fuel ultraviolet emission in a region about 220 to 
320 nm. (Figure 12) 
Figure 11: Thrust versus time for several missiles[18]p.21 
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Figure 12. Example of UV spectral data from a F404 jet engine, via Wilmot [18]  
3.2.3 Discussion of MWR systems 
Passive MWR systems are one of the electronic means of detecting missile launches on the 
surface, or from another aircraft. An alternative is the mm-region radar intended to detect and 
calculate the flight path of missiles flying towards the aircraft, but they were excluded from 
the study. 
Missile launch produce a plume that emits from to its surroundings in the IR region from 
1.14 μm to 15 mm. Sensors react to the radiation in the visible region, as well, but even if the 
subject of this extension to the paper would be extremely interesting, it must be dropped out 
of this study. The radiation in the ultraviolet band must also be taken into account, even 
though Ireo handbook passed [18] the matter rather quickly in one short paragraph. 
The starting point for a missile deception is the determination of the radiation emitted by the 
missile which is to be ―acted as‖. The measurements must be as comprehensive as possible in 
all regions of the ESM specter. Otherwise it might not be credible, and one does not cause any 
intentional false alarms to the EWSP. A question is, could it be possible to transmit the radia-
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tion plausibly enough so that the EWSP would warn the pilot. Research for this paper has not 
been able to answer that. Answer will not be in this paper, but is a start for a new research. 
3.3 Laser warning receivers 
Laser warning receiver is not really a piece of equipment that makes the aircraft too much 
safer above the battlefield. When laser is used on a AA-gun, or tank which is capable in 
shooting aerial targets, the shells are only seconds away. The function of the LWR as protec-
tive device of the aircraft is limited, as Heikell points out. [11] He adds: ―A further motivation 
for the LWR can be found if the EWSP suite is able to correlate data from multiple sources in 
order to decrease ambiguity of threat identification.‖  
3.3.1 LWR systems and measures of effectiveness 
Laser warning receiver (LWR) is applicable for almost any platform: fixed wing arcraft, heli-
copters, ground vehicles, ships, and satellites. Their function is to alert the platform of im-
pending attack involving fire control, or weapon, lasers; they also may directly activate ap-
propriate countermeasures. Laser receivers are used both for self-protection (i.e., warning) 
and general monitoring of the adjacent field of battle. Example of Saab EDS system is in the 
Picture 2. Latter is termed electronic support measures (ESM) in the electronic warfare (EW) 
community.[18] 
In a EWSP application the task of LWR‘s is to detect the signal, discriminate signals from 
false signals, characterize the laser, and locate the source of the laser. Table 11, adapted from 
IREO Handbook by Wilmot, presents common measures of effectiveness. Wilmot also sais 
the ―signal detection is related to system sensitivity and is usually limited by solar-shot noise 
and Johnson noise in the visible and near-IR regime and by detector/thermal noise in the mid 
and far infrared. [18]‖ The sensitivity of the sensor seems to be very critical and difficult to 
succeed part of the system. They point out the problem with the LWR is in the way the energy 
of the laser hits the sensor. It could, on the other hand, in different situations come directly 
from the transmitter, or by after scattering from other nearby objects, so the signal level range 
from 4 to 10 orders of magnitude, and how it reaches the receiver and how far is the transmit-
ter has a great value. Thus dynamic range in sensitivity is an extremely important feature for a 
LWR receiver, Wilmot points out, and continues by telling a few good reasons: the signal 
should not destroy the receiver nor cause any saturation effects that could give incorrect ana-
lyze in the signal characterization. [18]  
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Picture 2. A wide wavelength covering Saab Electronic Defence Systems LWS-300 
sensor system: the Threat Display and Control Unit (TDCU) (lower left) with the Elec-
tronic Warfare Controller (upper left) and the four sensor units (right). Source: Jane‟s 
[22] 
Wilmot‘s text is a couple of years old already, which gives the idea that when he mentions the 
coherent detection techniques in LWR sensors as a cure for better false alarm rate they must 
be in more common use contemporarily. If the sensor is not utilizing coherent detection tech-
niques it‘s very sensitive for giving alarms from virtually any transient light source. For ex-
ample, sun glint, lightning, gun flashes, explosions and various optical beacons. Usually total 
immunity to all false sources is desired. What needs more attending to is to get clear what 
Wilmot means by saying ―most LWR specifications include an appropriate electromagnetic 
interference (EMI) requirement.‖  
To accomplish its task the LWR must be able to do coarse measurements of laser wavelength, 
intensity, duration, and pulse repetition frequency. These features and the values the signal 
gives help the LWR to make conclusions between weapon lasers, designators, rangefinders, 
countermeasure lasers and communication lasers. The LWR converts the data into discrete 
groups, bins it, for threat recognition. Localization of the threat with LWR has some issues 
and it can be very difficult because of the potential ambiguity caused by the photons incident 
on the receiver. If the beam comes directly to the receiver the task is quite easy, but when the 
photons are scattered in the atmosphere, or from other objects nearby, and hit the aircraft from 
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different or even multiple directions the task is not a simple one, for accurate localizing I 
would guess possibly even unmanageable in some situations. Wilmot adds that in most situa-
tions usually at least quadrant localization is required from the system, but for airborne LWRs 
a few degrees accuracy would give only an adequate grade and for precise counterattack 
methods require an accuracy of less than a milliradian. [18] 
Table 11: Measures of Effectiveness of laser warning system (LWR) and Common 
values of. 
Measure of Effectiveness Common value 
Sensitivity 10-6 to 10-3 W/cm2 
Peak Signal for Correct Analysis 1 to 103 W/cm2 
Dynamic Range (Analytic) 104 to 108 irradiance ratio 
Dynamic Range (Destruction) 108 to 1012 irradiance ratio 
False Alarm Rate 1 per hour or per day or per mission 
Probability of Detection 0,9 to 0,99 
Spectral Resolution Band to 0.01 µm 
Temporal Resolution (Duration) < 100 ns 
Temporal Resolution (PRF) 1 to 10-3 s 
Temporal Resolution (Interval) 10-1 to 10-7 s 
Direction of Arrival 1° to 45° 
Heikell has collected a very good table of questions considering the LWRs and their efficien-
cy. He approaches the difficulties from a slightly different angle, more hands-on type on Ta-
ble 12.  
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Table 12: Major challenges in LWR technology and alternative solutions, according to 
Heikell. 
LWR challenge Solution Note 
Suppression of false 
alarms 
Pulse rise 
time. 
Not entirely reliable due to rapid sun 
glithces, especially from helicopter‟s tail ro-
tor. 
Pulse energy. Challenging, since the dynamic range of 
LBR beams and indirect LRF splashes (low 
energy) and direct LRF hits (high energy), is 
50 dB (optical) or more. 
Polarization. Complex measurement techniques, false 
alarms from partially polarized non-laser 
sources.  
Signal coher-
ence. 
Military lasers are on ly partially coherent 
since the focus is on beam width, bandwidth 
and power density. 
Sensitivity. Very high sensitivity would allow determina-
tion of TOA between direct port scatter and 
indirect main beam. 
LBR signals Sensitivity. Tradeoffs required to achieve 10-5 W/cm2 or 
better; related to false alarm rate, band-
width, dynamic range, etc. 
AOA resolution Detector ar-
ray. 
Old single detector LWRs achieve only ±45° 
resolution, new systems reach ±1°. True 
need is a controversial issue.  
Wavelength band -- Typically 0,5 µm to 1,6 µm, addition of 
MWIR and LWIR bands increase costs and 
complexity. 
Wavelength resolution Multiple de-
tectors. 
Two partly overlapping detector wave-
lengths resolce total band in three parts (Si 
& Ge diodes for 0,5 µm – 1,6 µm band) 
3.3.2 LWR observables 
The observables of a LWR system are by Wilmot‘s classification so called basic source pa-
rameters, coherence, and radiation patterns. Under the term of basic source parameters are put 
the features determined by the laser material, the laser cavity or resonator, and the laser pump-
ing mechanism. The choices of configurations for individual applications are selected to ac-
complish the required task for the laser. These parameters are the wavelength and the purity 
of it, the polarization, and the beam width. [18] 
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Mainly the factor that determines what is the laser wavelength, is the laser material inside 
cavity resonator. All individual materials cause individual laser "lines". The material of the 
cavity resonator has also an effect on the polarization of the laser beam: gas lasers are usually 
linearly polarized, but many high energy, solid-state, military lasers are unpolarized. Atop that 
the modal properties of the laser affect the polarization, purity of wavelength, and beamwidth.  
The more the laser‘s output power is increased, the single-mode power output is limited by 
various optical and thermal imperfections and nonlinearities. That is why tactical military 
lasers are often highly multimode devices. [18] 
Some of the relations of the temporal structure important to laser discrimination and recogni-
tion processing are next explained briefly. Military lasers currently in use can be temporally 
characterized as continuous wave (CW), long-pulse, or short-pulse lasers. CW lasers are used 
in communications or missile guidance, and they usually are gallium arsenide semiconductor 
(GaAs) lasers or CO2 gas lasers. Modulations from kilohertz to gigahertz are used. In military 
applications the GaAs-lasers are mainly used in missile proximity fuses or potentially in 
rangefinders. Long-pulse lasers are used for laser illumination and weapon systems are appli-
cations where high energy is important. Ruby and neodymium:glass lasers can be pumped 
with a burst of energy, and they then lase their normal relaxation time of their laser medium. 
The duration of the pulse varies between 0,10 – 0,50 ms, compared to 15 – 30 ns of the short-
pulse lasers. Short pulse lasers are used when the short duration of the pulse is important atop 
the high peak power. With Q-switch technology short times as mentioned are possible to 
achieve, and is the commonly used method in the Nd:YAG rangefinder lasers, and pulse repe-
tition frequency may, according to Wilmot, vary between 1 Hz and tens of kilohertz.[18] 
One of the main observables of LWRs‘ is the coherence of the laser beam. It is process in four 
dimensions, and they can be envisioned in following way: propagation during time t, beam 
direction z, and orthogonal expansions in directions x and y, as demonstrated in Figure 12. 
―When such a beam originates at a source that radiates at precisely the same frequency (wave-
length) at all times, the wave travels regularly with the instantaneous intensity at each point 
along the direction of propagation and is totally described in terms of the intensity at the 
source at that instant and the number of wavelengths, or partial wavelengths, between the 
source and the observation point [18].‖ The biggest challenge with fully coherent radiation is 
with the frequency. If it changes on a random basis at least slightly it affects the regularity of 
the beam as well. The coherence of the beam, the electromagnetic field of two different ob-
servation points being consistent, is therefore never totally perfect but constantly varying over 
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some range of frequencies. All real sources are somewhat imperfect and their beam has a lin-
ewidth typical to its source‘s physical quality, and features such as laser material. Coherence 
time or temporal coherence refers to the duration of the beam being coherent, and coherence 
length to longitudinal distance along which the beam travels during this coherence time, re-
spectively termed longitudinal coherence.  
Figure 13: Envisionment of propagation of electromagnetic waves in four dimensional 
process. Legend: t = time, z = direction, x and y = orthogonal expansion dimensions 
of the beam. Source: via Wilmot & Co. [18] 
Laser beam are also characterized as areal sources, or point sources. Conventional optical 
sources are usually behaving as area targets. Point source laser device is coherent single-mode 
model. They are usually capable in diffraction limited radiation. Conventional laser mainly 
have a cone-like radiation pattern. [18] 
It is difficult to make quick, hasty and accurate decisions on laser warning receiver data found 
in the literature. Thought, that the laser beam is fully coherent, and because of that feature, 
always being distinguished from all other radiation in the atmosphere, is clearly not right. The 
data presented by Wilmont suggests that quite clearly. Since the laser beam is not completely 
"clean" also the receiver needs to distinguish not only fully coherent beam as a potential 
threat. In the contemporary battlefield the use of lasers is in favor of a very large number of 
x
y
z
t
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weapon systems due to its accuracy as a distance measurement tool. Laser range finders are in 
use on the anti-aircraft weapons systems, combat vehicles, anti-tank, artillery observe, and 
scouting teams, and as well as with any other user who needs accurate distances measured in 
the changing circumstances and locations. Atop the LRF, no other significant military equip-
ment utilizes laser visibly to airborne surveillance than LBR-systems, as mentioned before. 
3.3.3 Discussion on the laser warning system 
The literary study of laser warning systems showed me that to deceive them may have one 
quite fundamental problem: they are not likely to be enough by themselves, especially when 
trying the misleading against low-flying airplanes or helicopters. LWS‘s are designed to warn 
of laser radiation hitting the sensors, which can hit it either directly or reflected in any other 
subject, as described earlier. I figure at this moment that low flying airplanes and helicopters 
have even a high probability to alert from laser radiation several times during the task. My 
conclusion therefore is that, in order to ensure credibility of the ploy, the LWRs are not suffi-
cient enough alone to take advantage when trying to mislead the pilot and the EWSP aboard. 
Naturally in real combat situations the final results are affected by many factors, such as I 
have outlined in my introduction chapter.  
When the LWS is continuously alerting the pilot of the possibility of a threat it reduces the 
real threats vicinity and EWSP‘s possibility to do a correct threat evaluation. Thus the proba-
bility increases for a threat on the ground to get lost in the masses and stay undetected; possi-
bly to the point it is too late. This is caused with factor the laser is built closely enough to its 
real-threat model. The positive increase in the probabilities of the match between the EWSP 
of the aircraft and laser counter-countermeasures would cause improvement the number of 
damaged or shot-down aircraft, because  
- the first warnings of measurements of the distance to the plane with laser 
rangefinder, used to calculate a preliminary point for anti-aircraft cannon be-
fore a single shot is fired,  
- the use of a laser beamrider-type missiles‘ guidance beam go unnoticed. 
More analysis and comparison between receivers and methods is conducted in the chapter 5. 
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3.4 Radar warning receivers 
Radar‘s (acronym for RAdio Detection And Ranging) function is, in short, to detect a target 
regardless of visibility and in almost any weather conditions by transmitting radio waves and 
listening to their echoes. If the waves are concentrated into a narrow beam, the direction of 
the target can be determined. Range is calculated from the measuring of the transit time taken 
for the wave to travel to the target and back to the radar. By repeating the sweeping of the 
radar beam the radar can detect the target. Once found the radar can start tracking the target 
either manually or automatically, which is a standard method in contemporary radars. The  
 
Picture 3: Spanish Indra made 0.5 to 40 GHz band radar “new generation” warning 
receiver, that is in operational use in many plane and helicopter types, including Finn-
ish Airforce‟s EADS CASA C-295. [23] 
radar calculates targets relative velocity by computing either (a) periodic samples of its range 
and direction obtained during the scan or (b) continuous information obtained by focusing the 
antenna on the target.  
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―The radar warning receiver is based on receiving radar wave area electromagnetic radiation.‖ 
[17] The thing is undoubtedly so, but a little more depth to the matter should be taken in fol-
lowing chapter. It has commonly been said that air-surveillance radar is visible from hundreds 
of kilometres of distance the moment it starts transmitting. It‘s not the purpose of this paper to 
proof that argument, but airborne radar warning receivers can be presumed to notice a trans-
mitting radar even further than the range of it. Some calculations with this dilemma of the 
radars is done in the conclusions.  
With an airborne RWR the crew of the aircraft notice the activity of the hostile air-defence, 
and if the radar parameters are well known, could possibly even recognize the source with 
accuracy of exact air-defence system.  
In this chapter will first be introduced the work and measures of effectiveness of RWR sys-
tems. Second paragraph sweeps quickly through radar jamming methods, for they are im-
portant partner of action with the receivers: EWSP includes jamming of the threat radars or 
radars of threat missiles trying to hit the aircraft. Last sub-chapter deals with the observables 
of RWR‘s. 
3.4.1 Radar warning receiver systems and measures of effectiveness 
According to Wiegand the general requirements of EW radar warning receivers are based on 
three major factors: EM wave signal characteristics, geometric characteristics, and output us-
es. EM wave signal characteristics are maybe the most important factors, and they include 
- ―threat-radar signals, 
- friendly signals,  
- commercial and other signals, 
- signals from the asset being protected, and 
- jamming signals [15].‖  
Geometric characteristics are also very important, and might have some influence later in this 
paper. Continuing the list made by Wiegand there are included characteristics as  
- ―transmit antenna patterns,  
- receiving antenna patterns,  
- distances,  
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- propagation factors such as atmospheric loss, 
- background clutter, 
- multipath, and 
- horizon and line-of-sight issues [15].‖ 
The output uses determine the usage of the data collected by the receiver. Wiegand suggests 
[15] they should be closely coupled with some parameters of the receiver requirements. This 
information could become a useful later in the discussion part of the RWR, or they could be 
more useful for questions dealing with the countermeasures against radar. Still, there has only 
little found of the inner life of EWSP systems, and them taking advantage of the data collect-
ed with RWRs, and therefore they are not going to be dealt any further in this paper. Never-
theless, the requirements of the output uses are, as Wiegand lists them: 
- ―trigger intrapulse or leading edge functions, 
- signal-processing functions, and 
- jamming optimization or set-on functions. [15]‖ 
Later Wiegand is describing how the EM wave characteristics, signal and geometric, delineat-
ed above can be combined in favor of characterizing the input by definition or description of a 
much shorter list. In that list are 
- ―individual intercepted threat signals, 
- threat-signal density versus frequency, AOA (angle of arrival), and-so-on, 
- self-jamming and self-blanking, 
- front-end noise and other interfering signals, and 
- external jamming.[15]‖ 
Knowledge of the threat system‘s radar or radars can be used when defining the radar warning 
receiver‘s requirements. That knowledge itself is obtained from the transmissions of the radar 
itself or simply its operating manual. When it is commonly known fact [15] that the intercept-
ed radar signals are one major source for electronic warfare counter and surveillance 
measures, those parameters should be well hid from the foreign surveillance, and not show off 
with everything, if not necessarily needed; and, the much this paper is concerned, that‘s how 
it is or should be done.  
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RWR properties also depend on the purpose of the whole system. Electronic support measure 
system and electronic counter measure system have consistent requirements of the detection 
of the signal, but the information they provide is different. In some places ECM system must 
be able to detect the radar signal in side lobes, for example, if the purpose is to interfere with 
the radar through the side-lobe so that the radar sees the target in a different direction than it 
in reality is. This method is known as angle deception. On the other hand electronic support 
measures may require detecting the sidelobes as well with method and in situations, wherein 
the angle deception is used. Radar countermeasures are briefly dealt in the next chapter 0. At 
this point must be noted that if deception is effectively used against radars, why not against 
the attacker using the same methods.[15] 
Quite naturally the first thing defined from the received signal is the type of the radar, that is, 
is search, track, active missile guidance radar, et cetera. Classifying the signals can be done 
by dividing them into coherent or non-coherent, and by the spectrum they use: fixed frequen-
cy, spread spectrum, or agile carrier frequency. Signals can often be classified as chirp or 
phase coded signals by their compression.[31] One key driving factor for EW receivers design 
is the classification of the duty cycle of the received signal. Duty cycle, or factor, ―is the frac-
tion of time the radar is transmitting [24]‖, and it was mentioned earlier in the Table 6. Duty 
cycles are classified as continuous wave, high, medium, or low. Higher the duty cycle, is the 
harder it is for the receiver to notice the signal. [15] In Table 13 are shown some requirements 
of the receivers.  
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Table 13: Selected receiver requirements, via Wiegand. Legend: MDS = Minimum 
Detectable Signal; AOA = Angle-of-Arrival; DSP = Double sideband. Via Wiegand 
[15] 
Parameter Typical Value Fundamentally de-
termined by 
Other determination 
MDS sensitivity -50 dBm 1) Distance 
2) Cross section of 
asset 
Weakest main-beam 
signal, or weakest 
sidelobe-signal to 
maintain track 
Sensitivity ad-
justment 
20 dB 1) Threat geometry 
2) Need to take early 
actions 
Need to thing signal 
environment 
Dynamic range 25 dB 1) Distance changes 
2) Differences in ERP 
Main-beam to side-
lobe level 
Pulsewidth 0.5 µs 1) Size of asset 
2) Resolution needed 
Radar function and 
type 
AOA Resolution 10° 1) Geometry 
2) Jammer ERP 
needs 
1) Signal separation 
2) Other DSP func-
tions 
3) Transmitter 
beamwidth 
Output interface 50 b/pulse Jamming use 1) Signal separation 
2) Signal ID 
3) Jammer set-on 
values 
Cost 10–40 % of ECM 1) Value of asset 
2) Degree operated in 
harm‟s way 
Complexity needed 
for sensor function 
Size and weight 10–40 % of ECM Nature of asset Proper balance with 
other major subsys-
tems 
 
There are quite a few different sensors and receivers available for ECM and ESM systems and 
they include  
- crystal detector receivers,  
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- channelized receivers, 
- frequency measurement receivers, 
- angle-of-arrival sensors, and 
- tunable receivers.[15]  
Crystal detector receivers rely on the use of crystal as detector material, which has a natural, 
wide RF bandwidth and fast video output response. A RF signal becomes a video signal after 
its envelope or phase detection. The RF diode —what the crystal actually detector is— recti-
fies the incoming RF alternating current and sends it forward in the system as video signal 
that is single-polarity voltage dependent only on the amplitude of the incoming RF signal, not 
its frequency or phase. Crystal detector receivers are divided into threshold detect crystal vid-
eo receivers (CVR) and logarithmic-video amplifier (LVA) receivers. CVR is the most com-
monly used RWR, and is the simplest one [25], and an ECM system may consist of many of 
these. In CVR system the crystal feeds a difference amplifier, which is an integrated circuit, 
or chip[26]. The output of this chip is either a logic ―1‖ or a logic ―0‖, and they are designed 
to change between these two logic states rapidly when the threshold voltage is crossed. In a 
LVA receiver the video signal is treated differently. The crystal, which measures the ampli-
tude of the input RF signal, sends the video signal to a logarithmic amplifier. Log amp‘s de-
sired function is to output a video voltage level that is proportional to the logarithm of the 
input RF power. An LVA needs a separate A/D converter to convert the signal into digital 
form, because in a modern ECM or ESM system almost every non-RF functions are done 
with digital processing. [15] 
The digital signal processor of the ECM system needs to know the carrier frequency of the 
radar signal for separating and tracking them. A channelized receiver (or wide-open (WO) 
RWR [5]) can provide a solution to this. It is practically a bank of CVRs where each of the 
receivers deals a separate band of the RF signals coming through a RF filter. And each of the 
CVRs send their video signal to an OR gate. The OR gate will show a positive indication [27] 
if there is a signal from at least one of the CVRs. Each CVR feeds also a flip-flop which is 
interrogated by multiplexer, usually one at time. The multiplexer sends the information of 
from which channel (CVR) it has given a logic ―1‖, and this channel is at the same time a 
coarse measure of the detected frequency. The CRSs are not the most expensive part of the 
system, but if an explicit channel width is desired, it could result in major cost increase. Usu-
ally the range is 5–50 MHz, and requirements to narrow that include 
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- the pulsewidth of a typical radar, 
- MDS sensitivity, 
- frequency selectivity, 
- maximum size of the system, and 
- amount of assets for the development and purchase. [15] 
Instantaneous frequency measurement (IFM) receiver provides an almost instantaneously 
measured carrier frequency of the incoming RF signal. Its response time is so short that it‘s a 
fraction of most practical radar pulsewidths. Crystal detectors are included, once again, but 
the IFM includes also couplers, a fixed attenuator, and a delay line. RF input signal power is 
divided in two paths, one of which contains the delay line and the other a fixed attenuator. 
The attenuation in both lines is nominally the same. They are then combined again with a hy-
brid coupler which feeds the two crystals. The video signal from both the crystals is changing 
depending on the frequency. At some frequencies the two signals combining in the coupler 
are 180° out of phase, and all the power goes to the crystal X. At other frequencies the power 
goes to crystal Y, ―and the pattern repeats across the band.‖[15] Calculating the frequency is 
then done by mathematics. [15] 
In the analog delay line type described above the amplitude of the input signal must not 
change with frequency. Twice as many crystals and hybrid couplers are needed to provide 
automatic dynamic range normalization. The crystals are summed in pairs, and these two pairs 
then feed an operational amplifier each. Op amp‘s task is to sum the opposite polarity signals. 
This arrangement is called an RF phase correlator. The output of the op amps can be shown 
on a conventional polar display, where X and Y video voltages are shown as coordinates. A 
more contemporary method is to send the signal next to an A/D converter, and from there it to 
its utilization. The phase correlator can measure the AOA of the RF signal, if it is made to 
calculate the phase difference between two antenna elements. [15] At some points the Wie-
gands book seems a little oldish for contemporary use, but the idea of the receivers work 
comes clear. 
Angle of arrival calculation is important to the ECM and ESM systems, as well. This can 
simply be made by calculating the amplitude difference between two antenna elements, or 
like described in the last chapter above. In amplitude comparison the antennas are at slightly 
different angle, but their main beams are still overlapping. Yet again, the crystals in line with 
each antenna convert the signal into video signal, of which polarity is then summed in an op 
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amp. After that the signal is converted into digital form, and send to its utilizer and/or display. 
[15] 
All the RWR methods described above have a useful instantaneous bandwidth of multi-GHz. 
A sweeping, or tunable, receiver has, on the contrary, a narrow IBW. It is needed when the 
received signals overlap, and thus corrupt the measurements with receivers described earlier. 
Tunable receiver can be used to supplement the data from CVR, LVA, channelized, and IFM 
systems. Wiegand shows to types of tunable receivers: a YIG-tuned (Yttrium Iron Garnet) 
receiver, and a superheterodyne receiver. The YIG-tuned receiver is made by simply adding a 
YIG-tuned filter in front of a broadband CVR or LVA receiver, or both. The YIG-tuned filter 
passes through a certain frequency when a certain amount of currency is fed to magnet in it. 
The hysteresis phenomenon, the frequency passed through is higher when tuning down than 
when tuning up at the same currency, is a well-known problem with a YIG-filter, but it‘s 
avoidable. [15] 
The superheterodyne receiver (superhet) is one of the oldest receiver designs existing. In su-
perhet receiver the RF signal is beat to the intermediate frequency (IF), and then amplified in 
the IF amplifier. IF amplifier, also known as IF strip, supplies two outputs: discrimination 
voltage and the video voltage. The video output shows the strength, and the discrimination 
output shows the relative frequency within the receiver‘s IBW. The mixer that beats the in-
coming RF signal is steered from the voltage controlled oscillator (VCO), which again is 
steered digitally through an A/D convert. Superhet receiver linearity is poorer than with the 
YIG-tuned receivers, caused by the linearity problems with the VCOs. On other hand, their 
sensitivity is told to be better than with crystal receivers‘.[15] 
Radar warning receivers brief overview on this study doesn‘t go any further. It was a necessi-
ty, however, because it is precisely those that main research problem is directed, and the LWR 
and the MWR. Brief overview of the RWR has brought a lot of information also for future 
chapters dealing more with RWR observables. 
But the radar signal doesn‘t stay in the receiver but continues further in the system for identi-
fication and tracking, for example. These matters, and other involved in the digital processing, 
will be covered next in this sub-chapter. 
When the incoming RF signal has been detected and transformed into video signal, and later 
into digital signal, begins many very interesting procedures in the digital signal processor of 
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the RW system. CPU and DSP perform digital processing functions that are shown in Figure 
14. It includes the sensor block, for clarity, which is dealt earlier in this chapter. The primary 
functions of the digital processing are  
- ―signal processing, 
- signal identification, 
- signal track and prediction, 
- waveform generation, and 
- central processing.‖[15] 
 
Figure 14: An example figure of digital prcessing functions of a radar electronic coun-
ter measure system, via Wiegand. 
The central processing unit (CPU) has a variety of software-generated functions that, in time-
scale of their actions, include  
- technique determination,  
- priority conflict resolution,  
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- resource allocation,  
- parameter setup,  
- data and parameter maintenance,  
- gain and power control,  
- slow servo functions, and  
- built-in tests.  
All of these listed tasks are not shown very interesting for being more than introduced in this 
paper. The technique determination is simply picking the best-rated technique against the 
threat that is identified. It becomes difficult if several threats need to be dealt with a preset 
mode. It actually becomes a problem of the priority conflict resolution and/or resource allo-
cating functions. The system has only certain amount of resources to be used at a time, and 
priority conflict occurs if there are more threats to handle than resources available. The sys-
tem is most efficient if it either transmits, or is fully prepared to start transmitting the moment 
the triggering radar signal is detected. [15].The text gives the idea of the CPU being crucial 
element of the system as a whole, which though is not a great surprise in a modern world 
filled with electronic devices.  
The signal sorting and identification are dealt more later in the chapter 3.4.3 RWRs‘ observa-
bles. It is a significant factor of determining the signal authenticity, so it deserves its own 
chapter. 
Pulse repetition frequency (PRF) tracker has a duty as one of the means to sort the input inter-
leaved pulse train. Sorting is done for separating or de-interleaving the input signals. PRF 
trackers predict the moment for transmitting when such jamming is used that needs prediction 
and exact timing before the triggering signal is received. PRF trackers are very important me-
chanics in an EWSP system, so there are strict requirements for quality given to them, includ-
ing 
- ―TOA gate jitter, 
- acquisition time, 
- vulnerability to missing pulses, 
- vulnerability to interfering signals,  
- harmonic acquisition inhibit, 
- stagger acquisition, 
- vulnerability to multipath induced leading edge modulation, and 
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- vulnerability and response to agility.‖ [15] 
Wiegand notes the two first criteria being most often mentioned when talking about tracker 
performance. Usually the tracking can begin with three to four incoming pulses. TOA gate 
jitter is the other important criteria,[15] and knowledge of these brings a new idea of noticing 
if the possible deceptive bait is taken: if the opposite side starts timed jamming against used 
frequencies.  
Digital signal processing of EWSP systems, and any systems, is in constant development pro-
cess. Producing materials are getting better in all aspects, and handling methods of them im-
prove. DPS systems‘ performance will continue to advance in the future, but predicting the 
evolution is not in this papers questions. 
3.4.2 Active electronic countermeasures against radar 
Differing from the missile warning receivers and laser warning receivers, the radar warning 
receivers are —at least they could be— used for active electronic counter measures. And it is 
much more usual than with the first two ones. Radar is, the way the subject seems to research-
er, an electronically vulnerable transmitting and receiving equipment, and many different 
countermeasures are known to be used to blind or distract them. Because of the nature of 
RWR being part of active ECM, a short subchapter of those countermeasures could be useful 
and justified, before going any further in the observables of the receivers, and in the analysis 
of the distracting possibilities of them and whole systems. 
A very compact way to determine the active ECM is how Wiegand puts it in his book: ―‖an 
active ECM technique‖ refers to a method used to negate the effectiveness of threat radar sys-
tems by transmitting EM radiofrequency signals.[15]‖ Doing that is properly is not as simple 
as it sounds; non-active ECM includes evasive actions and moves, dispensing flares to distract 
electro-optical missiles, or dispensing chaff to blur the RF signals of radar. Other than self-
protective active ECM options include methods used for stand-off jamming, and escort jam-
ming, and multiple spatially diverse on-board jammers. Stand-off jamming, namely, ―standing 
out of harm‘s way‖, is done with large, powerful transmitters from a distance where it is out 
of the range of close and medium range air defense, or air-to-air weapons. Usually these air-
crafts are built solely for this and other EW purposes, and work as protecting the engaging 
aircraft from a distance. Escort jamming is similar in the way that they are planes equipped 
mainly to the countermeasures, and those planes are usually carrying very capable and rela-
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tively expensive EW equipment with them. Differing from the stand-off jamming craft the 
escort jamming planes come usually substantially closer to where all the action is, and are 
thus substantially more vulnerable to the air defense and air superiority fighters. In both cases 
the craft engaging targets in the battlefield may, or may not have self-protective ECM, or they 
may not use them. Spatially diverse jammers are on-board those airplanes acting in the battle-
field and engaging their targets and thus are very likely to be targeted themselves by the air 
defense or fighter planes. The cooperative ECM waveforms used in this cost-effective method 
may be free-running, synchronized with accurate clocks, or with synchronizing communica-
tions. [15] 
These active ECM systems usually have a set of jamming-deception methods either fixed or 
set on a mission basis. Wiegand book is more than twenty years old now, so what he mentions 
about the ―modern active ECM systems -- have a repertoire of techniques from which sopisti-
cated double sideband(DSB) subsystems make selections and set parameters in real time.‖ 
Controlling the ECM electromagnetic waves in time, carrier frequency, carrier phase, ampli-
tude, polarization, and direction suitably is a compulsory. DSB subsystems are not further 
unwrapped, and for further information of DSB one should be referred to Wiegand‘s text. [15]  
Self-protective active ECM is practically the same method as described above about the other 
methods, but in smaller scale, and with a smaller task to fulfill. Negating search radar func-
tions, making tracking radars more difficult to accomplish their acquisition modes, negating 
radar tracking and guidance modes of radar guided weapons, and jamming missile and muni-
tion functions. Summary of possible and maybe the most potential active ECM techniques 
against different radars are shown in Table 14.  
As the nature of this sub-chapter was simply to unveil the purpose of the output of the RWRs, 
not to start a further study of the subject, there will be no deeper knowledge presented. For 
further reference on the subject one should acquire the Wiegand‘s [15], Stimson‘s [24], or De 
Martinos‘s [5] book. 
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Table 14: Some basic electronic counter measures used against different types of 
radars, via Wiegand. [15] 
For countering a *** radar… …this is a useable technique: 
1) Search False targets or noise either from spatially diverse 
ECM sets or into sidelobes 
2) Track acquisition Blinking on and off or switching among jamming 
techniques 
3) Conical scan angle track-
ing 
Transmitting high power except near center of radar 
antenna main beam 
4) Range tracking Transmitting noise or pulses around (just before, on, 
and just after) the true target range position 
5) Doppler tracking Phase-frequency modulation to cause a false fre-
quency offset 
6) Monopulse angle tracking Range jamming (#4 above); once the range track 
has moved to a false range, use data-rate reduction 
to starve the radar angle track servo so that it drifts 
off the true angle.  
3.4.3 RWRs‘ observables 
Radar warning receiver is made for detecting radar signals. Detection is only the first part of 
the target acquisition process [28] proceeding recognition. If in detection, as talking of radar 
signals, the target‘s presence is noted, in recognition the target has been determined to have 
potential military interest. Next step is identification of the signal as a military radar signal of 
search, track, and et cetera radar. The target‘s or threat‘s location is then tried to be found out. 
That matter was dealt in an earlier chapter, though. Radar signal identification is hard to be 
kept separate from recognition, or that would at least be little artificial. That‘s why only iden-
tification will be spoken of later.  
During this chapter the will be presented a brief list of the matters the radar warning system, 
part of ECM or ESM, is truly interested in and from which it identifies an incoming signal to 
be a real threat among all the RF signals transmitted, and reaching the receivers.  
Sorting the signals aims for separating incoming signals from each other, and is done in a 
processing unit of the radar warning system. Radar signals are transmissions in pulsed or CW 
mode. Examining the relation between pulses, called pulse-train sorting, is used for low- to 
medium-duty cycle signals. [See also Table 6 and chapter 3.4.1] Single-pulse measurement is 
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possible, as well, and both are considered effective. Segregation of pulses into bins is done 
with parameters  
- ―RF carrier frequency, 
- AOA, 
- pulsewidth, and 
- intrapulse modulation.‖ [15] 
The list above is at the same time the list of the most important signal parameters to get as 
close to the original radar‘s parameters as technically is possible, when considering the decep-
tive transmitter‘s parameters.  
Multidimensional processing is considered as an effective method, as well, and it aims in eas-
ing the signal separation‘s burden. Its advantages are illustrated in Figure 15 below. From top 
to bottom, the paragraphs represent five pulse-trains A, B, C, D, and E, with unique ampli-
tude, pulsewidth, and PRI; the PRF spectrum; and the RF carrier frequency. 
 
Figure 15: Two-dimensional processing, via Wiegand [15]. 
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It is possible to examine three or more input parameter dimensional spaces with the DSP al-
gorithms, but their visualization becomes difficult. Two dimensional visualization is still easy 
to understand, such as the graphs of the Figure 15: pulse-trains A & B seem to have the same 
pulsewidth, but in the bottom graph they are separated because of their different RF carrier 
frequency. 
3.4.4 Discussion of radar warning receivers 
RWR system‘s demand for processor performance appears to be on the most demanding on 
from the group of different warning systems. In order to distinguish the correct radar trans-
mission from each other, as well as intentionally or unintentionally transmitted ones, and the 
reflected ones, it must be able to make a continuous, very fast, and accurate work, such as in 
subsection 4.4.3 is illustrated.  
The most up-to-date source of this study says WO RWR system is currently the most com-
monly used of the RWR systems. De Martino continues that contemporary systems include in 
growing numbers the IFM system, as well. [5] According to that, there is a reason to believe a 
RWR of a modern military aircraft has such a combination of equipment per se. Worst case 
scenario -thinking cannot go as an empty exercise here. 
It is certainly possible to build a credible deceptive ―pseudo-radar‖ device, if it follows the 
same idea as with laser and missile deception: measurements must have been done in labora-
tory environment to make the decoy‘s radiation transmission identical with its original model. 
The challenge is, tactically speaking, that the radiation must come from a credible direction. A 
short example about the effect of the AOA devices impact to distraction: A radar is transmit-
ting, and an aircraft detects the RF signal. Quite clear presumptions can be made about the 
detection when the aircraft begins trying to jam the radar. If the radar is needed to change to 
new area, it can be done during the normal alternation and pacing of transmitting. When the 
radar stops transmitting, the pseudo-radar is turned on when timing is plausible, and the radar 
can retreat. The situation should look normal from the aircraft‘s point-of-view. In this case, 
the risk of anti-radar missile (ARM) hitting its target is radically reduced. Pseudo-radar, how-
ever still in the danger zone, is significantly less expensive than the radar. And there are cer-
tain known methods to reduce the risk of ARM hitting the radar, or pseudo-radar. 
The AOA resolution must be taken into consideration when planning such plots. Wiegand 
suggests it‘s typical value is 10°[see Table 13]. Wiegand‘s book is already ageing in the scale 
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of EW, and therefore in calculations made in the Table 15 is few different resolutions used. If 
then the systems communicate between each other, and capable of triangulating the position 
of radar [29], range maximum between radar and pseudo-radar could become much smaller.  
Table 15. Calculations of the impact of different AOA accuracies on the distance be-
tween the radar and decoy. Legend: AOA = Angle-Of-Arrival; A/C = aircraft. 
AOA resolution (DEG) 
 
α 
Distance of 
A/C (km) 
d 
Radar to pseudo-
radar range (km) 
  
 
   
    
10 10 1,67 
8 
 
1,33 
6 
 
1,00 
10 20 3,33 
8 
 
2,67 
6 
 
2,00 
10 50 8,33 
8 
 
6,67 
6 
 
5,00 
10 100 16,67 
8 
 
13,33 
6 
 
10,00 
3.5 Discussion of warning systems 
Short discussion of each warning receiver is in the end of their sub-chapters, respectively. 
This closing discussion of the warning systems as a whole is meant to draw short conclusions 
of observations made in the Warning Systems chapter. 
EWSP systems cover the electromagnetic spectre from ultraviolet region (abt. 200 µm) all the 
way to UHF frequencies (500 MHz [23][30]). Different regions of EMS are covered follow-
ingly: 
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- ultraviolet: MWR 
- visual light: MWR, LWR 
- infra-red: MWR, LWR 
- radio waves (other): not in interest 
- radio waves (UHF): RWR 
- micro waves: RWR 
The answer to the question about different observables of each warning receiver cannot be 
answered in one simple sentence. Therefore a collection the observables are combined into 
Table 16 below.  
Table 16. Combination of the observables of each warning system. 
Receiver… …and a collection of its observables. 
Missile warning receivers * heating caused by atmospheric friction 
* reflected radiation 
* hot engine  
* exhaust gases (the plume). 
Laser Warning receivers * wavelength (and purity of it) 
* polarization 
* beam width 
* temporal characters (CW, short-pulse, 
long pulse 
* coherence (temporal & longitudinal) 
* areal vs. point source 
Radar Warning receivers * carrier frequency 
* pulse repetition frequency 
* pulse width 
* scan type/ Digital beam-forming  
* bandwidth (BW) 
* polarization 
* coherence 
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4 ANALYSIS OF DECEPTION 
In the past chapters are covered the different threat systems, terminal and non-terminal, and 
EWSP systems aboard the aircraft. EWSP systems design aims in doing the best to prevent 
the aircraft to end its flight too early. The main task of this paper was to find the best possibil-
ities to succeed in deceiving the airborne EWSP systems. A pressing question ―What type of 
apparatus could do the decoy‘s job and what kind of requirements for them should be consid-
ered?‖ This chapter will deal with these questions. By answering to the pressing question on 
each warning receiver the answer to the main research question comes more and more clear. 
EWSP is an integrated entity [29] or, at least, should consider as one. Its separate receivers 
collect information of radiation surrounding the platform that could be harmful against it, or 
other friendly platforms. Jotta sen harhauttaminen olisi mahdollisimman suuri onnistuminen, 
pitää eri vaihtoehtoja pohtia mm. panos-tuotos ajattelun avulla.  
The missile deception has many challenges. The live missile firing is always a logistical chal-
lenge since the number of missiles should be expected to be limited. This is probably reality 
to all of the armed forces except, perhaps, the biggest military powers that have invested in 
major financial contributions to their armed forces‘ procurements. A single modern anti-
aircraft missile price today is easily 100'000 €, or more. The smallest shoulder-fired missiles 
could be cheaper. It could be a financial relief for smaller armies to think that the substitute 
for a real missile would cost, maybe, a tenth of the original. The plume of this pseudo-missile 
must be designed and tested to be close enough to its model. The MWR system identifies cer-
tain wavelengths of simultaneous thermal, visual, and ultraviolet radiation which emits from 
the plume to surrounding environment.  
Other specific requirement of the rocket development work is to consider what happens to it 
after the rocket engine has burned out. Opening a parachute immediately after the burnout 
could blow the deception. The pseudo-missile must also have enough intelligence aboard that 
it is able to be guided towards the target for a sufficient amount in time. Temporal and spatial 
considerations of the missile‘s flight must also be done. How long should it fly? How far from 
the launch pad it is then? These assessments must be made according to the missile‘s model. 
The rocket motor burn time could be from two to five seconds, and the total flight time of it 
from five to ten seconds, respectively.  
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Expanding the flight time will definitely increase the probability for the MWR to detect this 
possible threat, warn the pilot, and execute ECM. If  the plume is not visible enough for the 
MWR to notice it, for any reason,  the friction heating the skin of pseudo-missile could cause 
the false alarm instead. Heated skin was another source of thermal radiation for the MWR to 
react, and visual approach should be thought of, as well. The arguments are proven earlier in 
the MWR chapter 3.2.2.  
A major question arises from this kind of deceptive action: what are the vested interests of 
this action? The plane could spend its flares or chaff-dispenser [32] for a false alarm, but the 
pseudo-missile will never make a kill. Though, the real missile systems hit-probability on 
one-on-one scenario gets higher [13]. 
The challenges with laser warning receivers are different than of those with MWRs. Earlier in 
the chapter 3.3.3 was stated the way how a laser beam can hit the receiver directly, and by 
reflecting from objects in the beam‘s way. The research has given a varying picture about 
LWRs in action. They seem to be so sensitive that they alert the system almost all the time the 
craft is above battlefield and there is no more than one user of laser equipment on the ground. 
On the other hand their MOE states the FAR of LWR should be less than one in hour. This 
must be questioned! There could be a simple answer to the confusing situation: the age of the 
Wilmot‘s text. IREO handbook vol. 7 was introduced back in 1993 [18], and prices of elec-
tronics in general have come down since then. That has made greater number of laser devices 
in battlefield affordable in greater numbers. This doesn‘t base on any more profound research 
than simple reasoning.  
Like noted above, the MOE of LWRs are loose enough to make any LSR an possible dummy. 
Pseudo-laser is not a good name here, because the apparatus would still do its original task, 
and work as decoy only when decided. Controlling the use of LRFs is another topic. If they 
are scattered around the battlefield, only general instructions of their use could be given. Con-
trolled large-scale operation against air-threat is presumably going to end unsuccessfully. No 
guarantee can be given for troops 1) receiving all the instructions and understanding them 
fully, and 2) remembering or obeying them after days or weeks of combat.  
General instruction should be simple: whether to use LRFs against aircraft, or not. Some extra 
notes could be added, like what kind of situations are preferred, how is own concealments 
preserved, et cetera. But smaller scale operations aiding the use of AAA or other air-defense 
is plausible to succeed, if it‘s in hands of smaller group whose aim is simply to give time to 
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the air-defense teams to prepare their launch. This is achieved by pointing the aircraft a few 
moments before the group is using their integrated laser device, and continuing doing so for a 
while longer.  
Considering the vulnerability of the sensitivity of LWRs, their use could be more cautious 
than the use of MWR‘s. If MWR gives an alarm it should cause action, but when LWR notic-
es the presence of laser radiation it might mean nothing. It could be it has happened many 
times before on that mission, at least if the ground troops point all possible laser apparatus 
towards the aircraft flying by, or further off. Consequence of imbuing the LWR with constant 
false alarms could lead to positive results when a real AAA platoon‘s or LBR team firing 
preparations are not noticed. LWRs‘ real ability to classify beams from each other‘s wasn‘t 
clarified during the research, but that was expectable due to covering of confidential and vul-
nerable information. 
EWSP is not only a passive system. EWSP systems take actions against emerging threats, 
even only possible such. This means countermeasures against missiles. Flares and chaff are an 
example of those. It seemed that RWR‘s priority was to gather information solely for the 
means of ECM against the threat radar. Using decoys or so called pseudo-radars and some 
calculations regarding that was briefly presented in the discussion paragraph of the RWR 
chapter. Imbuing a contemporary RWR is maybe not possible because of contemporary 
CPU‘s calculation and multitasking speed. RWR is constantly receiving information, and 
even Wiegand showed in a figure (Figure 15) back in 1991 how RWR is dealing with five 
different radars. It could be that number was underrated for simplifying already then, and real 
multi-radar tracking volume is presumably much higher in contemporary radar ECM systems. 
ECM system does the actual tracking, and the receivers are, namely, for receiving the signals.  
The principals of making pseudo-radar differ in no way of the making of a pseudo-missile: the 
electronic signature need to be brought as close to the original radar being pretended. This is 
measured in laboratory environment. The resources used to purchase the EWSP might be-
come actually the most crucial requirement of the RWRs and ECM systems. It is possible that 
the signal is not possible to make close enough to the radar to keep the disguise against big 
scale electronic warfare support measurement‘s. Smaller EWSP systems on the other hand 
could be bought.  
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When considering the possible assemblies, uses, tactics, and plausible effects, the best single 
method against airborne EWSP system is the deception of the RWRs and the ECMs in con-
nection with them.  
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5 CONCLUSION 
5.1 Evaluation of the results 
This paper makes good progress in the search of the answer to main and pressing questions. 
Answers were found to all of the questions but one. During the process many some examples 
of electronic deception was found [33], but no sign was made of any device for this kind of 
deceptive action, prototype or in production. Not actually any research that would come close 
to this paper‘s subject. This was quite shocking news at first. It brings some other questions in 
mind: Could it be possible that the subject really isn‘t examined earlier at all? Or, has it been 
done and later made decision not to proceed with the subject? Whatever the reason has been, 
this paper is one solely concentrating on electronic deception of EWSP.  
The supplementary tasks are fulfilled with the chapters dealing them, respectively. Threat 
systems signals and their transmitters are presented in chapter 2. The focus was not in this 
matter more than was vital in explaining the basis of the whole paper. The second two ques-
tions were more important from the main task‘s point-of-view. They are as much opened as it 
was practically possible in a brief research as this one. Their answers are split into three para-
graphs of the chapter 3, each warning receiver in its own. 
5.2 Evaluation of the scientific contribution 
Facing the fact that no other research has been made from this narrow perspective, it must be 
said that the path-opening value for this paper could rise. Still it is too early to determine this 
papers ground-braking value. Others can do that.  
5.3 Suggestions of topics for future researches 
One suggestion rises from the idea mentioned in the MWR section: deceiving the MWR with 
an artificial electronically produced missile launch. 
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